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Blockchain’s Struggle to Deliver 
Impersonal Exchange 
Benito Arruñada* 
The paper identifies what value blockchain adds to the 
contractual and property processes, exploring its potential and 
analyzing the main difficulties it is facing. It argues that, 
contrary to naive conceptions that proclaim the end of 
intermediaries and state involvement, blockchain applications 
will rely on a variety of interface, completion, and enforcement 
specialists, including standard public interventions, especially 
for property transactions. Without these interventions, 
blockchain applications will at most enable trade in in personam 
claims instead of in rem rights, therefore facilitating personal 
instead of truly impersonal—that is, asset-based—transactions. 
Keywords: property rights, enforcement, transaction costs, 
impersonal exchange, blockchain, distributed ledgers, smart 
contracts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Blockchain—often known as “distributed ledger 
technology”—has been sold as the most important technological 
innovation in today’s economy.1 Even if it is difficult to separate 
substance from hype, it is clear that not only have thousands of 
blockchain applications been launched, but the biggest firms in 
many industries are investing substantial amounts of resources 
in blockchain-related efforts.2 However, it is also becoming 
apparent that serious and recurrent difficulties are delaying, if 
not killing off, what for the time being are still modest 
applications of the technology. 
This paper aims to ascertain the importance of blockchain 
and clarify both the development of blockchain applications and 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER 
TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 8 (2016) (claiming that blockchain 
technology “provides the framework for government to reduce fraud, corruption, 
error and the cost of paper-intensive processes. It has the potential to redefine 
the relationship between government and the citizen in terms of data sharing, 
transparency and trust. It has similar possibilities for the private sector.”). 
 2. Including the food, financial services, energy, pharmaceuticals, health, 
aerospace, aviation, telecommunications, IT and communications, transport, 
utilities, agriculture, and oil and gas industries. Simon Taylor, Vision, in 
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra note 1, at 
24. Based on a survey of 134 global market participants in capital markets, 
Greenwich Associates estimate that in 2016 financial service firms and 
technology providers spent more than one billion USD worldwide to adopt 
blockchain in capital markets alone. RICHARD JOHNSON, GREENWICH ASSOCS., 
BLOCKCHAIN ADOPTION IN CAPITAL MARKETS 6 (2016). The same study 
estimated in June 2016 that venture capital investment in blockchain 
technology had climbed to over 440 million USD. Id. at 3. 
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the necessary adaptive decisions to be made in business firms’ 
strategies and legal institutions. After introducing the basics of 
blockchain and its most disruptive application (so-called smart 
contracts), the paper will explore the main challenges faced by 
blockchain applications. It will do so from the perspective of the 
economic analysis of property rights. It will therefore pay 
particular attention to, first, the legal distinction between 
contract (personal or in personam) rights and property (real or 
in rem) rights;3 and, second, the related distinction between 
private and public legal “ordering.”4 As a consequence, the paper 
complements efforts to understand the economic effects of 
blockchain on transactions that in fact deal only with in 
personam rights.5 
The analysis will be grounded on the theoretical and 
empirical premise that, while market participants can trade 
contract rights easily under private ordering arrangements 
based on reputational assets and the expectation of future trade, 
trading in in rem rights requires a minimum of public ordering—
in particular, an enforcer who is neutral and independent not 
only of parties to a given contract but to all holders of property 
rights on the type of asset being traded in that market.6 
In line with this premise, the paper will analyze how a 
common problem of some pioneer applications of blockchain lies 
in a tendency to overestimate the power of private ordering and 
to minimize that of trusted intermediaries, which has often led 
                                                          
 3. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in 
the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: 
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S373 (2002). 
 4. See Benito Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from Property, in THE 
ELGAR COMPANION TO RONALD H. COASE 305 (Claude Ménard & Elodie 
Bertrand eds., 2016) [hereinafter Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from 
Property]; Benito Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange: The Forgotten 
Limits of Private Contract, 13 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 753 (2017) [hereinafter 
Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange]. 
 5. See, e.g., Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, Some Simple Economics 
of the Blockchain (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22952, 
2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22952. 
 6. See BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL 
EXCHANGE: THE THEORY AND POLICY OF CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES 67–71 
(2012) [hereinafter ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS]; Arruñada, 
Coase and the Departure from Property, supra note 4; Arruñada, Property as 
Sequential Exchange, supra note 4. 
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to frustrated expectations.7 This is not a new problem, however, 
as land titling and administrative simplification efforts have 
been suffering similar problems for the same reason.8 Therefore, 
blockchain development can benefit greatly from borrowing 
insights from the critical analysis of the recurrent management 
and policy mistakes made in these areas. This is particularly so 
in property applications, as analyzed in Section 5. 
II. A BRIEF ON BLOCKCHAIN AND “SMART CONTRACTS” 
A. THE NATURE OF BLOCKCHAIN 
Blockchain is the technology underpinning the bitcoin 
cryptocurrency.9 As with any other type of money, electronic 
money must make sure that it changes hands without risk of 
being diverted and is not spent twice by the same individual.10 
Traditional payment systems solve these problems by relying on 
central, specialized, and trusted third parties such as banks, 
payment systems, credit card companies, and clearing houses.11 
In contrast, the blockchain solved them with a peer-to-peer 
solution.12 It is capable of replacing the trusted third party 
because it contains the history of all previous transactions, so is 
a source of evidence for establishing who owns what at any given 
moment.13 To achieve this feat, it replicates the ledger in a 
multitude of computers or “nodes,” making all the history of 
                                                          
 7. See infra notes 106–112 and accompanying text. 
 8. See Benito Arruñada, Pitfalls to Avoid when Measuring the 
Institutional Environment: Is ‘Doing Business’ Damaging Business?, 35 J. 
COMP. ECON. 729 (2007); Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange, supra 
note 4. 
 9. See, e.g., Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating 
Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 577 (2015) (“[Blockchain] is the core 
innovation driving the bitcoin currency system.”). 
 10. See, e.g., id. at 577 n.54. 
 11. See, e.g., Jeremy Clark, Foreword to ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., 
BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE 
INTRODUCTION XI–XIII (2016). 
 12. See, e.g., Kiviat, supra note 9, at 580 (footnotes omitted) (“[B]lockchain 
establishes trust between two parties to a transaction through both a 
decentralized public ledger and a cryptographic mechanism that ensures 
transactions cannot be changed after the fact. One can easily see why the 
creator of this technology called it ‘purely peer-to-peer . . . electronic cash.’”). 
 13. See, e.g., id. at 578–79 (footnote omitted) (“[Blockchain] makes a 
collective accounting by distributing a shared (that is, decentralized) public 
ledger—a complete record of all past transactions on the network.”). 
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transactions public, accessible, and widely distributed across the 
whole network of users.14 
Moreover, before entering the ledger, transactions must 
achieve the consensus of the community, produced online by a 
mechanism in which the participants implicitly agree to change 
the blockchain.15 Assume, for example, that A and B are 
members of the community of users. E.g., both have bitcoin 
“wallets,” a type of software that accesses the Internet without 
identifying the owner (a paradigm of impersonality),16 even if 
their personal identities are always protected by cryptography. 
Assume also that A wants to transfer an asset (e.g., bitcoin 
money) to B. A’s wallet first proposes to change the blockchain 
to reduce A’s balance and correspondingly increase B’s balance. 
This proposal circulates around the network and participants 
are invited to confirm it by checking the ledger, which requires 
solving a complex cryptographic puzzle. Solving the puzzle 
demands plenty of computing power, as it must be done by trial 
and error. Some specialized users (called “miners”) compete in 
solving it.17 The system motivates these miners by paying them 
                                                          
 14. For a reliable introduction, see ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN 
AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 
(2016), its printed version will be quoted here, but its draft version is available 
at https://d28rh4a8wq0iu5.cloudfront.net/bitcointech/readings/princeton_
bitcoin_book.pdf?a=1. For detailed explanations, see the descriptions in Rainer 
Böhme et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance, 29 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 213, 215–19 (2015); Trevor I. Kiviat, supra note 9, at 576–88; and Carla 
L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized 
Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 196–
202 (2016). For the abundant literature that emphasizes blockchain’s potential, 
see WILLIAM MOUGAYAR, THE BUSINESS BLOCKCHAIN: PROMISE, PRACTICE, 
AND APPLICATION OF THE NEXT INTERNET TECHNOLOGY (2016); DON TAPSCOTT 
& ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND 
BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD (2016). For a short 
introduction, see The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, ECONOMIST, Oct. 
31, 2015, at 19. 
 15. See Böhme et al., supra note 14, at 217. 
 16. But see Marc Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 
2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters (detailing 
that this does not mean anonymity: “Much like email, which is quite traceable, 
Bitcoin is pseudonymous, not anonymous. Further, every transaction in the 
Bitcoin network is tracked and logged forever in the Bitcoin blockchain, or 
permanent record, available for all to see. As a result, Bitcoin is considerably 
easier for law enforcement to trace than cash, gold or diamonds.”). 
 17. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 124–30 (showing that for a long 
time now, most miners have been operating through “mining pools,” sharing 
revenue according to the effort of each miner, which places the pool manager in 
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when they create a new block (e.g., twenty-five bitcoin or around 
16,387 USD as of the date of this writing). The lucky miner is 
paid after other miners confirm the solution (which is an easy 
task). Only then is the new block added to the blockchain. In 
sum, the ledger is distributed in thousands of computers and the 
final version is the one accepted by a majority of computers.18 
The system is protected against tampering and revision by 
duplication of the blockchain in many computers and 
concatenation of any subsequent blocks,19 which makes it 
trivially easy to verify that the whole content of the chain has 
not been altered. The abovementioned puzzle refers to each 
block’s “header” that contains a “hash” produced by a 
cryptographic function, plus some other data specific to the block 
(e.g., each block contains a timestamp and a link to a previous 
block).20 The header is easy to produce on the basis of the 
information in the chain.21 Therefore, if the chain’s contents 
were modified, the change would cause an easily observable 
discrepancy, and the latest block would be rejected.22 
Cheating is made even harder by the fact that it is not 
possible to predict which specific miner will solve the puzzle. 
Moreover, no miner can manipulate the chain because 
participants work on the longest chain. By the time a miner 
(imagine an A who wants to pay B) has been able to manipulate 
it, other participants would already be working on an alternative 
blockchain.23 Therefore, a malevolent A would need to lengthen 
                                                          
a strong position, potentially reaching high levels of mining concentration. Even 
if their market shares have been fluid, real concentration is unknown because 
large miners can participate simultaneously in several pools (a practice known 
as “laundering hashes”)). 
 18. See Vitalik Buterin, The Meaning of Decentralization, MEDIUM (Feb. 6, 
2017), https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/the-meaning-of-decentralization-
a0c92b76a274 (distinguishing between architectural (how many computers can 
break down?), political (how many people ultimately control the computers?), 
and logical (if the system is cut in half, will both halves continue operating?) 
decentralization by stating “[b]lockchains are politically decentralized (no one 
controls them) and architecturally decentralized (no infrastructural central 
point of failure) but they are logically centralized (there is one commonly agreed 
state and the system behaves like a single computer)”). 
 19. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional 
Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1462–75 (2011) (detailing the potential benefits 
of the costly solution of having redundant repositories of information). 
 20. See The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, supra note 14. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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the chain faster than all other users, which in principle would 
require A to control more than half of the network’s computers.24 
B. SMART CONTRACTS 
Blockchain applications have been expanded by embedding 
information in the ledger, potentially including in it all steps in 
the contractual process, from ensuring the reliable recording and 
archiving of data to transferring all types of assets.25 Therefore, 
blockchain technology is now applicable not only to payments 
but to all sorts of contracts; thus, instead of exchanging digital 
tokens valuable by themselves and existing only in the ledger 
(such as Bitcoin), parties can exchange representations of claims 
in all types of physical or digital assets existing outside the 
ledger. 
                                                          
 24. See generally JOSHUA A. KROLL, IAN C. DAVEY, & EDWARD W. FELTEN, 
THE ECONOMICS OF BITCOIN MINING, OR BITCOIN IN THE PRESENCE OF 
ADVERSARIES, 1 (2013), http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2013/papers 
/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf (including an analysis of the different 
equilibria of bitcoin participants and the security risks they pose. On this basis, 
they “argue that Bitcoin will require the emergence of governance structures, 
contrary to the commonly held view in the Bitcoin community that the currency 
is ungovernable.”); MAGNUS KEMPE, THE LAND REGISTRY IN THE BLOCKCHAIN 
34 (July 2016) (proposing development steps for the future). 
 25. See, e.g., BLOCKSTACK, https://blockstack.org/ (last visited Oct. 24, 
2017) (showing how Blockstack allows registration of identities, public keys and 
names in the blockchain, providing more security than traditional identity, 
naming, and digital registries); COINSPARK, http://coinspark.org/ (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2017) (detailing how CoinSpark allows messages and assets to be added 
to bitcoin transactions, allegedly making it possible to “transfer any asset over 
the Internet” and “notarize important emails on the blockchain”); COLU, 
https://www.colu.com/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (claiming to provide a tool for 
creating local economies, including the issuance of digital currencies); 
EVERLEDGER, http://www.everledger.io/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (showing 
how Everledger is implementing a fraud-prevention registry of luxury goods 
such as diamonds, which, by recording their distinguishing attributes, would 
help provide proof of identity in case of theft); FACTOM, https://www.factom.com 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (showing Factom tried to provide a prototype of land 
registry based on the blockchain to the Honduras’ Property Institute). But see 
KEMPE, supra note 24, at 11–12, 15 (showing that it is the unique cryptographic 
hashes, which serve as verification records, and not the transaction documents, 
that are saved in the blockchain (consequently, this is another source of 
duplication, as two separate systems are kept in place to preserve both 
documents and hashes). The documents can be saved by many other parties, 
including parties to the affected transactions. This replication plus the set of 
verification records —also duplicated in the blockchain— guarantee that their 
integrity is preserved). See generally TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 14, at 
115–44 (detailing a general view of blockchain’s applications). 
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One of its most ambitious applications is implementing the 
decentralized “smart contracts” first proposed by Nick Szabo, 
which feature automatic execution: they contain a set of rules 
that trigger predefined responses corresponding to particular 
contingencies.26 (Vending machines, video-on-demand, and 
ATMs could be seen as simplistic antecedents. Multiple 
initiatives have been developing to implement smart contracts, 
from the very simple to the most complex. )27 In a way, they use 
the blockchain ledger as their enforcement mechanism,28 so that 
transactions are supposed to be conclusive or “immutable.” 
                                                          
 26. Nick Szabo, The Idea of Smart Contracts, MANUSCRIPT (1997) 
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literat
ure/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/securetitle.html (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2016). The term, “smart contract” was seemingly first used by Nick 
Szabo: 
Many kinds of contractual clauses (such as collateral, bonding, 
delineation of property rights, etc.) can be embedded in the hardware 
and software we deal with, in such a way as to make breach of contract 
expensive (if desired, sometimes prohibitively so) for the breacher. A 
canonical real-life example, which we might consider to be the 
primitive ancestor of smart contracts, is the humble vending machine. 
Within a limited amount of potential loss (the amount in the till should 
be less than the cost of breaching the mechanism), the machine takes 
in coins, and via a simple mechanism, which makes a freshman 
computer science problem in design with finite automata, dispense 
change and product according to the displayed price. The vending 
machine is a contract with bearer: anybody with coins can participate 
in an exchange with the vendor. The lockbox and other security 
mechanisms protect the stored coins and contents from attackers, 
sufficiently to allow profitable deployment of vending machines in a 
wide variety of areas. 
Id. See also Nick Szabo, Secure Property Titles with Owner Authority, 
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literat
ure/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_idea.html (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2016). 
 27. See Jamie Burke, 99% of Blockchain Startups Are Bullshit, MEDIUM 
(Mar. 17, 2017), https://convergence.vc/99-of-blockchain-startups-are-bullshit-
4cf11a549895 (showing that, in fact, most smart contracts are quite dumb: “It’s 
often very simple if-this-then-that”). For instance, payment to miners adding a 
block is deferred until 99 more blocks have been added to the chain. Similarly, 
decentralized crowdfunding services automatically go ahead only with projects 
that receive enough funding. See, e.g., LIGHTHOUSE PARTNERS, http://www 
.lighthouse-partners.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2016). 
 28. Kiviat, supra note 9, at 603–05 (stating that decentralized smart 
contracts are understood as “contracts that leverage a secure public ledger as 
an enforcement mechanism”). The basis of smart contracts is that they add 
conditions to the simple set of instructions (“script”) of a bitcoin transaction, 
which consists of only three parts: “(1) Party A sends a message to the network 
declaring the transaction; (2) Party B accepts the transaction by broadcasting 
its acceptance; and (3) the network participants verify the transaction’s 
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Understandably, the blockchain is often defined as a “trust 
machine” because it, supposedly, “lets people who have no 
particular confidence in each other collaborate without having to 
go through a neutral central authority. Simply put, it is a 
machine for creating trust.”29 In this vein, some authors argue 
that smart contracts are such a fundamental innovation in the 
way transactions are organized and the scope for their 
application is so wide that they threaten the position of all sorts 
of intermediaries that provide trust or overcome the lack of trust 
between traders, including, most prominently, the role of 
lawyers.30 However, smart contracts are subject to serious 
                                                          
authenticity.” Id. Added conditions could reflect the parties’ desire that the 
transaction occur only under certain circumstances or at a certain time, etc. Id. 
 29. The Trust Machine, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015) (also stating that “[t]he 
blockchain . . . [i]n essence . . . is a shared, trusted, public ledger that everyone 
can inspect, but which no single user controls. The participants in a blockchain 
system collectively keep the ledger up to date: it can be amended only according 
to strict rules and by general agreement,” and “[t]he real innovation [behind 
bitcoin] is not the digital coins themselves, but the trust machine that mints 
them—and which promises much more besides.”). But see NARAYANAN ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 280 (emphasis added) (showing how complementary reliance 
on trusted components is necessary for achieving security, the real objective and 
a much less ambiguous term than trust, which is only one of the means to 
achieve it and stating that “‘Trust minimization’ is a worthwhile goal in the 
sense that other things being equal, we want to build systems with fewer 
components that we’re reliant on for security. But when you have a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail, and Bitcoin enthusiasts often get carried away with 
removing trusted components from systems. A trusted component is not always 
bad, and the existence of a real-world trust relationship is certainly not a 
problem by itself.”). 
As we will see below, the applications make ample use of intermediaries 
acting as “trusted components.” 
 30. For example, a major Australian law firm concludes: 
At this stage, we aren’t convinced that “smart contracts” will replace 
lawyers altogether. Currently, most use cases for smart contracts 
involve the execution of relatively simply contractual instructions or 
control functions. Some of the real advantages of smart contracts arise 
in the context of low value payments, which would cost more to enforce 
than the value of the transactions. For a smart contract to work 
effectively, the parties to a transaction need to be able to precisely 
define an outcome to make it the subject of code. The more complicated 
the provision or relationship, the more difficult it will be to code. 
However, it is likely that over time, smart contracts will apply to 
increasingly complicated situations, and be used for different purposes 
beyond simple commercial transactions. 
ALLENS LINKLATERS, BLOCKCHAIN REACTION: UNDERSTANDING THE 
OPPORTUNITIES AND NAVIGATING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF DISTRIBUTED 
LEDGER TECHNOLOGY AND BLOCKCHAIN 15 (2016) (emphasis added), http:// 
www.allens.com.au/data/blockchain/index.htm?sku=fsdah5e556eqweqwg. 
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limitations. As we will see below, once we move away from 
extremely simple transactions, it is necessary to consider a large 
number of possible contingencies, and this exponentially 
multiplies the difficulty of codifying the proper contractual 
outcomes. When envisioning these systems, we must avoid 
falling into the trap pointed out by Hayek with respect to 
economic planning:31 scientific and statistical information is 
relatively easy to collect, aggregate, and transfer, but specific 
information includes “circumstances of time and place” that are 
well-nigh impossible to aggregate or transfer. Knowledge 
necessary for completing contracts often hinges on specific 
circumstances that cannot be easily standardized or conveyed. 
Moreover, automatic execution is costly to the extent that it 
would preclude efficient breach.32 
III. BLOCKCHAIN AND CONTRACT, IN PERSONAM, 
RIGHTS 
In principle, as explained above, the blockchain makes no 
use of specialized third parties for enforcement. It is not 
uncommon to find claims that blockchain or “DLTs [distributed 
ledger technologies] pose a threat to any hierarchical structure 
through an ability to connect and operate in a distributed 
                                                          
 31. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. 
REV. 519, 524 (1945) (“[T]he sort of knowledge with which I have been concerned 
is knowledge of the kind which by its nature cannot enter into statistics and 
therefore cannot be conveyed to any central authority in statistical form. The 
statistics which such a central authority would have to use would have to be 
arrived at precisely by abstracting from minor differences between the things, 
by lumping together, as resources of one kind, items which differ as regards 
location, quality, and other particulars, in a way which may be very significant 
for the specific decision. It follows from this that central planning based on 
statistical information by its nature cannot take direct account of these 
circumstances of time and place, and that the central planner will have to find 
some way or other in which the decisions depending on them can be left to the 
‘man on the spot.’”). 
 32. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 266 (5th 
ed. 2008) (“[G]iven costly renegotiations . . . the damage remedy for breach of 
contract has an advantage over specific performance, just as compensation has 
an advantage over injunction in nuisance cases with negotiation costs.”). Law 
and economics has developed a whole subfield around the concepts of incomplete 
contracts and efficient breach. See also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 304–14 (2004) (analyzing remedies for breach of 
performance, including different type of damages and specific performance). 
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network, without trusted or necessary intermediaries.”33 In 
particular, smart contracts are supposed to work without third-
party intervention, which theoretically avoids the risk of ledger 
manipulation by governments or other third parties. To this 
extent, smart contracts could, therefore, be understood as a 
paradigm of pure private ordering.34 
In fact, however, blockchain applications require the 
intervention of between-parties intermediaries to write the code, 
run the system, and store data, in order to manage what can be 
seen as mere contract or in personam rights.35 For instance, in 
addition to those making the rules,36 blockchain applications 
                                                          
 33. Phil Godsiff, Disruptive Potential, in DISTRIBUTED LEDGER 
TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra note 1, at 61 (emphasis added); see 
also Fred Ehrsam, How the Blockchain Could Change Corporate Structure, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2016, 10:39 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-
blockchain-could-change-corporate-structure-1476887998 (“[W]e will no longer 
need central companies to act as the middleman.”). 
 34. Cf. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 14, at 199–201 (showing 
blockchain has been considered by Libertarians as a means to get rid of the 
state altogether). However, a more nuanced view is in order. For instance: 
While a maximalist vision for decentralization might involve 
dismantling the state, this is not really [a] viable vision, especially 
when others who share our democracy want [a state]. However, 
decentralization through technology is not necessary in opposition to 
the state at all. In fact, they can be mutually beneficial. For example, 
assuming well-identified parties, transfers of smart property can use 
the block chain for efficient transfers and still use the court system if 
there is a dispute. We think the big opportunity for block-chain 
technology is implementing decentralization in a way that 
complement[s] the functions of the state, rather than seeking to 
replace them. 
NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 285. 
 35. For an introduction to the distinction between property (in rem) and 
contract (in personam) rights, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 3; Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 3. See also ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, 
supra note 6, at 15–34 (discussing the distinction’s economic consequences); 
Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from Property, supra note 4, at 305–19 
(discussing the distinction’s economic consequences). 
 36. Trust in a governing third party is required for the continued operation 
of blockchain applications. Rules need to be changed, and governance decisions 
are recurrently needed. This raises a paradox because: 
[O]nce you address the problem of governance, you no longer need 
blockchain; you can just as well use conventional technology that 
assumes a trusted central party to enforce the rules, because you’re 
already trusting somebody (or some organization/process) to make the 
rules. . . . The differences to conventional technology are no longer that 
apparent. Perhaps blockchain technologies can still deliver better 
technical performance, like better availability and data integrity. But 
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may require other agents, such as “oracles,” to monitor external 
or “off-blockchain” information for conditions that trigger 
contractual execution (e.g., whether the market price of oil 
reaches a certain level when that level is specified in a 
conditional clause of the contract), as well as “curators,” to 
perform a variety of functions, including the pre-selection of 
application proposals and the prevention of attacks.37 Even the 
dependence on oracles is thought to “undermine the goal of 
agreements free of human caprice.”38 And it is undeniable that 
curators add some degree of centralization and specialized 
enforcement.39 Moreover, there are reasons to think that the 
                                                          
it’s not clear to me what real changes to economic organization and 
power relations they could bring about. 
Vili Lehdonvirta, The Blockchain Paradox: Why Distributed Ledger 
Technologies May Do Little to Transform the Economy, POL’Y & INTERNET BLOG 
(Nov. 21, 2016), http://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/policy/the-blockchain-paradox-why-
distributed-ledger-technologies-may-do-little-to-transform-the-economy. 
Additionally, there might be economies of scope (with respect to rule 
making and rule enforcement) in providing the level of trust required to 
safeguard the operation of the trading system. See, e.g. Curry, Global 
Perspectives in DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, 
supra note 1, at 77 (“Federated trust enables confidence and risk reduction.”). 
This may be why, according to Lehdonvirta, systems such as RSCoin and R3 
openly rely on trusted third parties. Lehdonvirta, supra (“R3’s design seems to 
have something . . . which look[s] a lot like trusted third-party enforcers . . . . 
RSCoin likewise relies entirely on trusted third parties.”). 
 37. Not-So-Clever Contracts, ECONOMIST (July 28, 2016) [hereinafter Not-
So-Clever Contracts], http://www.economist.com/news/business/21702758-time-
being-least-human-judgment-still-better-bet-cold-hearted (“[T]rusted parties, 
known as oracles, could supply the data to a blockchain[.]”); The Curator, THE 
DAO, https://daohub.org/curator.html [https://archive.is/jFmPb] (“A curator is a 
failsafe mechanism that indirectly prevents malicious actors from executing [a] 
51% attack”); see also What Is Ethereum Classic, CRYPTOCOMPARE (Aug. 3, 
2016, 11:05 AM), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/what-is-
ethereum-classic; The DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard Fork, 
CRYPTOCOMPARE (Sept. 28, 2017, 5:10 PM), https://www 
.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-the-hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-
fork. 
 38. Not-So-Clever Contracts, supra note 37. 
 39. In the DAO case analyzed next in Section III.A, the six “curators” were 
private individuals who, among other functions, pre-selected proposals. The 
DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard Fork, supra note 37. The DAO 
claimed: 
A Curator is a failsafe mechanism that indirectly prevents malicious 
actors from executing 51% attack. Curators do not add centralization 
to the DAO: they are nominated by the DAO Token Holders 
themselves, and can be fired at any time, for any reason. Curators 
curate the whitelist, the list of Contractors authorized to receive ether 
from the DAO. 
2018] BLOCKCHAIN’S STRUGGLE 67 
 
development of applications and, in particular, smart contracts 
will increasingly rely on modules created and vetted by 
specialists: the supply side of the industry will likely be based on 
a chain of multiple vertically-linked suppliers.40 
A. THE PRESENCE OF CENTRAL ENFORCERS 
More revealingly, smart contracts may even require 
enforcers in a more traditional sense for contract completion.41 
                                                          
The Curator, supra note 37. Curators within the DAO only performed two 
functions: 
Check that the published Contract on the Ethereum blockchain 
matches the source code the Contractor claims to have deployed (this 
is done by comparing bytecode). 
Confirm that a Proposal comes from an identified person or 
organization. This is done by asking the entity submitting the Proposal 
to send a signed transaction with a certain set of data only known to 
the Curator and the author of the Proposal, thereby confirming the 
author of the Proposal. 
Id. These two functions were also performed by token holders, who were also 
responsible for evaluating proposals, auditing proposals’ “smart contract code,” 
providing legal advice regarding proposals, and taking “economic 
responsibility” for the proposals. Id. However, their enforcement role became 
evident during evolution of the venture. Ryan Shea, Simple Contracts Are Better 
Contracts: What We Can Learn from the Meltdown of the DAO, BLOCKSTACK 
BLOG (June 17, 2016), https://blog.blockstack.org/simple-contracts-are-better-
contracts-what-we-can-learn-from-the-dao-6293214bad3a#.ym078tjga (“The 
Ethereum community found itself in a position where it had to step in and 
reverse the damage, thereby essentially making a small number of players the 
enforcers of the truth of all contracts.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Demian Brener, The Ugly Truth About Blockchain, MEDIUM 
(Sep. 29, 2016), https://blog.zeppelin.solutions/the-ugly-truth-about-blockchain-
applications-73e55cad9582 (providing an example of such a module). 
 41. Competitive arbitration implemented through “2-out-of-3 
multisignature transactions” is one form of relatively conventional third-party 
enforcement. See, e.g., NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 278–79. Even 
Bitcoin works with a substantial degree of human rulemaking: 
[T]he initial version of the software was published by Satoshi 
Nakamoto (a pseudonym). In 2010, Nakamoto handed control of the 
project to Gavin Andresen, an Australian-born programmer living in 
the United States. Like any software, Bitcoin needs to be regularly 
updated to address bugs, security issues, and changes in the operating 
environment. Such an update can in principle change any aspect of the 
software, including accounting and ownership rules. Who gets to write 
the software and how that process is governed is therefore critically 
important to all participants in a distributed ledger system. 
In the case of Bitcoin, the software is governed by an ad hoc 
process involving a handful of informal institutions and power 
holders. . . . The software is open source and anyone can suggest 
changes to it, but technical authority to admit changes to the official 
version of the software is held by a team of five core developers 
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This presence of third party enforcement was clearly pointed out 
by “The DAO” incident occurring in 2016 in the Ethereum 
platform, which was then considered the paradigm of smart 
contracts,42 and aimed to implement the “code is law” principle 
coined by Lessig,43 according to which the code itself provides 
conclusive enforcement.44 After an initial successful launch of 
                                                          
appointed by Andresen. The core developers’ power is constrained by 
an informal self-imposed charter, which states that significant 
changes to the rules require broad consensus from the community. . . . 
This governance process worked well when the changes to the code 
were uncontroversial bug fixes, but it has started to show signs of 
breaking down recently, because some decisions require choosing 
which stakeholders’ interests to prioritise over others’. 
Vili Lehdonvirta & Ali Robleh, Governance and Regulation: Two Types of Rule-
Making, in DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra 
note 1, at 43. 
 42. See, e.g., Kiviat, supra note 9, n.238 (citing Ethereum as a foundational 
smart contract blockchain application); Reyes, supra note 14, at 191 n.1, 201 
n.61 (same). For additional information regarding Ethereum, see Ethereum, 
White Paper: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application 
Platform, GITHUB, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2016) (Ethereum’s foundational manifest); Ethereum, Ethereum 
Homestead Documentation, ETHEREUM HOMESTEAD, http://www.ethdocs.org/en 
/latest (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
 43. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006). A narrower version of the same 
concept is that of Lex Cryptographia: “blockchain technology raises a series of 
novel legal questions that refer to a new body of law—which we term Lex 
Cryptographia—or rules administered through self-executing smart contracts 
and decentralized (autonomous) organizations.” Aaron Wright & Primavera De 
Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia, 
SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 4 (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract 
=2580664. 
 44. Ethereum sees itself as a platform for all sorts of automatically-
enforced contracts without intermediaries: 
Ethereum is a decentralized platform that runs smart contracts: 
applications that run exactly as programmed without any possibility 
of downtime, censorship, fraud or third party interference. 
These apps run on a custom built blockchain, an enormously 
powerful shared global infrastructure that can move value around and 
represent the ownership of property. This enables developers to create 
markets, store registries of debts or promises, move funds in 
accordance with instructions given long in the past (like a will or a 
futures contract) and many other things that have not been invented 
yet, all without a middle man or counterparty risk. 
ETHEREUM BLOCKCHAIN APP PLATFORM, (emphasis added) https://www 
.ethereum.org/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). Ethereum also encourages users to: 
[C]reate a tradeable digital token that can be used as a currency, a 
representation of an asset, a virtual share, a proof of membership or 
anything at all. These tokens use a standard coin API, so your contract 
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The DAO, an incident showed that implementing this principle 
is harder than it seems, as a failure in the original drafting of 
the contract led to its subsequent revision, showing that its 
terms were not conclusive and the blockchain was not 
immutable. 
The DAO (the acronym stood for “Decentralized 
Autonomous Organization”) was a sort of venture capital fund 
structured as a smart contract to which any investor could 
contribute “ether,” the Ethereum’s cryptocurrency, thus 
purchasing shares (“tokens”) and voting rights, which they then 
used on the projects they decided to support.45 In June 2016, 
after it had raised up to $250 million from thousands of backers, 
it emerged that someone had used a bug in its code to “siphon” 
from its original owners about $60 million worth of ether.46 After 
using similar tactics to fight a so-called DAO war for weeks,47 
the Ethereum team decided to implement a “hard fork.” (A hard 
                                                          
will be automatically compatible with any wallet, other contract or 
exchange also using this standard. 
Id. 
 45. The DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard Fork, supra note 37. 
 46. Paul Vigna, Ethereum Gets Its Hard Fork and the ‘Truth’ Gets Tested, 
WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/07/20 
/ethereum-gets-its-hard-fork-and-the-truth-gets-tested. The heart of the debate 
was how to characterize the action by the “hacker”: while many observers 
considered it as theft, the hacker alleged that it was simply the pre-established 
reward for having detected a loophole in the code. In an open letter addressed 
to the DAO and the Ethereum community, this self-described “Attacker” argued 
the following: 
I have carefully examined the code of The DAO and decided to 
participate after finding the feature where splitting is rewarded with 
additional ether. I have made use of this feature and have rightfully 
claimed 3,641,694 ether, and would like to thank the DAO for this 
reward. It is my understanding that the DAO code contains this feature 
to promote decentralization and encourage the creation of “child DAOs.” 
I am disappointed by those who are characterizing the use of this 
intentional feature as “theft”. I am making use of this explicitly coded 
feature as per the smart contract terms and my law firm has advised 
me that my action is fully compliant with United States criminal and 
tort law. For reference please review the terms of the DAO. 
An Open Letter: To the DAO and the Ethereum Community, PASTEBIN, (June 
18, 2016) (emphasis added), http://pastebin.com/CcGUBgDG. Apparently, “this 
withdrawal of funds, while unexpected, did not violate either Ethereum’s or The 
DAO’s rules, naïve as they may have been. Nor does it appear to have violated 
any laws.” Patrick Murck, Who Controls the Blockchain?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 
19, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/who-controls-the-blockchain. 
 47. See Mathew Leising, The Ether Thief, BLOOMBERG MKT. (June 13, 
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-the-ether-thief/. 
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fork consists of modifying the software so that it will validate 
blocks that the previous version considered invalid. It can 
pursue different goals, from eliminating security hazards in the 
code to implementing new functions or, as in this case, reversing 
transactions. )48 If the changes proposed by the Ethereum team 
were adopted by the community of users, by simply upgrading 
the software, this would effectively delete the allegedly 
fraudulent transactions and refund the money to its previous 
owners, but would endanger the conclusiveness of the 
contracting process. Consequently, “the Ethereum community 
found itself in a position where it had to step in and reverse the 
damage, thereby essentially making a small number of players 
the enforcers of the truth of all contracts.”49 
The hard fork therefore denied the conclusiveness or 
immutability that was predicated of smart contracts, which were 
supposed to have the law enshrined in the code, making 
enforcement and dispute resolution unnecessary.50 In 
particular, the Ethereum team was accused of conflict of 
interests and, in particular, of supporting the conclusiveness of 
transactions only “until something goes wrong that impacts the 
interests of a centralized authority.”51 Some degree of 
centralization was made visible by the promoters’ power to 
manage the system. Moreover, their ability to do so hinted that 
the possibility of similar interventions was present in all other 
blockchain applications. 
                                                          
 48. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 73. On the contrary, in a so-called 
soft fork, “all new blocks continue to meet the requirements of the old rules, so 
the old clients will accept new blocks as valid additions to the block chain. . . . 
Any change in the rules governing what constitutes the authoritative block 
chain will necessarily be a hard fork.” Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-
Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 382 n.128 (2016). 
 49. Shea, Simple Contracts Are Better Contracts, supra note 39. 
 50. Id. (“There are two problems here. First, when Ethereum allows forks 
to happen and override smart contract code, it’s giving up on ‘code as law’ and 
allowing the spirit of code to trump it when the execution deviates from the 
spirit. . . . Second, this casts doubt on the true decentralization of the system 
and invites regulators and oppressive regimes to step up in the future and apply 
pressure to reverse history and/or change the rules of the system. . . . Smart 
contracts are either ‘code as law’ or else they are mere social contracts.”). The 
key issue is, in these terms, that the hard fork treated them as social contracts. 
 51. Avtar Sehra, Building a Decentralised Ecosystem, SLIDESHARE, slide 9 
(Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.slideshare.net/arcatomia/ethereum-classic-18-
august-2016?qid=f687c929-6875-4c92-9f42-422ceaba64cc&v=&b=&from 
_search=7.  
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Consequently, the community was split and some important 
miners and exchanges started backing an alternative currency, 
called “Ethereum Classic” (ETC), which uses the original 
blockchain.52 Those who held Ether on it retained their rights, 
but for the funds stolen in the DAO attack.53 In the end, “that 
group of miners continued to mine the original (pre-fork) chain, 
essentially creating a new coin dubbed Ethereum Classic. By 
continuing on the non-forked chain, they . . . created two worlds: 
one where the DAO, along with all the consequences of its hack, 
still existed, and one where it never happened.”54 
This dual reality is possible because, while the only right 
that users of a conventional centralized currency have is to stop 
using it,55 users of a cryptocurrency have another option: they 
can also fork the rules, meaning that they “would rather operate 
under a different rule set, and . . . go in a different direction from 
the lead developers.”56 This is visible in a hypothetical example, 
taking Bitcoin as a reference: 
We can think of the currency we had up until the fork as being Bitcoin 
[i.e., in the real case, Ethereum]—the big happy Bitcoin that everyone 
agreed on. After the fork it’s as if, A-coin [i.e., Ethereum] 
corresponding rule set A and B-coin [i.e., Ethereum Classic] 
corresponding to rule set B. At the moment of the fork, everyone who 
owned one bitcoin receives one A-coin and one B-coin. From that point 
on, A-coin and B-coin operate as separate currencies, and they might 
operate independently. The two groups might continue to evolve their 
rules in different ways. 
 We should emphasize that not just the software, or the rules, or 
the software implementing the rules forked—the currency itself 
forked. This is an interesting event that can happen in a 
cryptocurrency that couldn’t happen in a traditional currency, where 
the option of forking is not available to users.57 
                                                          
 52. See The DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard Fork, supra note 
37; Duncan Riley, Ethereum Classic Takes Off Following Ethereum Hard Fork, 
SILICON ANGLE (July 25, 2016), http://siliconangle.com/blog/2016/07/25/
ethereum-classic-takes-off-following-ethereum-hard-fork/. 
 53. Ian DeMartino, As Ethereum Classic Forks, DAO Hacker Moves Funds, 
INSIDE BITCOINS (Oct. 25, 2016, 12:05 PM), http://insidebitcoins.com/news/
ethereum-classic-forks-dao-hacker-moves-funds/36505. 
 54. Id. 
 55. In general, most holders of claims in Williamsonian “relational 
contracts” (see infra note 80 and related text) are in a similar position: for 
instance, after failing in a shareholders’ meeting to advance their proposals and 
change the course of the corporation, minority shareholders can only vote with 
their feet by selling their stock. 
 56. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 171. 
 57. Id. at 172. 
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The evolution of both coins in the market (here composed 
not only of investors but also of exchanges and miners), in terms 
mainly of price and volume, hints how adequate the two sets of 
rules are. For instance, Ethereum Classic immediately became 
the third most traded cryptocurrency behind Bitcoin and the 
hard fork version of ether.58 Some months later, it had “refused 
to die despite the Ethereum Foundation’s repeated attempts to 
kill it”59 and looked relatively strong,60 a remarkable 
achievement considering that it had suffered numerous 
attacks.61 The survival of the two coins plus the fact that their 
total value was soon greater than the pre-forked value also 
suggest that the diversity of rules (with immutability in 
Ethereum Classic but more efficient breach in Ethereum)62 and, 
perhaps, the availability of such a competitive process for setting 
rules are valuable, probably providing better adaptation, as well 
as better control of developers. 
However, even if the goal of Ethereum Classic was to 
preserve the immutability of the blockchain and the 
conclusiveness of transactions, its claims of code-as-law were 
somehow diluted, by recognizing that “the infrastructure is not 
there to enforce and uphold law, it’s only a protocol that allows 
execution of immutable transactions and programs.”63 Despite 
                                                          
 58. Riley, Ethereum Classic Takes Off Following Ethereum Hard Fork, 
supra note 52. 
 59. Frances Coppola, Ethereum’s Latest Hard Fork Shows It Has a Very 
Long Way to Go, FORBES (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/francescoppola/2016/11/26/ethereums-latest-hard-fork-shows-it-has-a-very-
long-way-to-go/#6e4220f1443a. 
 60. For example, on October 17th, 2016, the market capitalization of 
Ethereum Classic was 9.33% that of Ethereum, making it the fifth 
cryptocurrency according to this metric. Thirteen months later (November 10, 
2017), however, its market capitalization had fallen to 4.83% of Ethereum and 
it was only the tenth cryptocurrency; and, even if its price had increased 
between those two dates by a multiple close to twelve, this was much less than 
Ethereum’s 23.6 (numbers calculated by the author with data obtained from 
https://coinmarketcap.com/). Given that, at that point, the main difference 
between the two coins was the original conflict, the market (and, crucially, the 
exchanges, as Classic was only traded by a few of them) was apparently not very 
appreciative of the conservativeness of Ethereum Classic with respect to 
immutability. 
 61. See Jamie Redman, A Victorious Rebellion? Microsoft Investigates 
Ethereum Classic’s Potential, BITCOIN.COM (Sept. 27, 2016), https://news 
.bitcoin.com/microsoft-looks-rebel-ethereum-classic/. 
 62. On efficient breach, see supra note 32. 
 63. Sehra, supra note 51, at slide 10. 
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being presented as a decentralized, non-governed blockchain 
system, Ethereum Classic also relied on third-party 
enforcement, only in the more conventional form of state 
intervention.64 As argued by one of its developers, the solution 
for failures should be based on “Legal Recourse. If anything goes 
wrong the infrastructure cannot be controlled into changing its 
state, recourse for financial crime and other illegal activities 
needs to take place through normal channels.”65 It can be 
concluded that, at least for fraud cases, Ethereum Classic relies 
on standard legal recourse (what could also be understood as a 
form of third-party contract completion) and blockchain 
integrity is dissociated from self-enforcement.66 
Ethereum Classic was a paradigm, but it is not a unique 
case. Bitcoin itself suffered a similar experience in the summer 
of 2017, when trying to reach a consensus to solve the technical, 
economic, and ideological conflict between miners, who wanted 
bigger block sizes, and code developers, who stressed security.67 
There was substantial uncertainty, which initially harmed the 
coin price and seemingly also gave rise to the creation of another 
coin (named “Bitcoin Cash”) through a hard fork.68 The episode 
                                                          
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Moreover, only a few months after its inception, Ethereum Classic itself 
proposed a rather technical hard fork to deal with several attacks it was 
suffering due to vulnerabilities in its code. Understandably, and despite not 
changing the history of blockchain, the proposal posed risks and triggered a 
similar controversy, with some parties claiming it would breach the “dogmatic 
application of immutability” that had been the main reason to create this new 
cryptocurrency in the first place. Andrew Quentson, Ethereum Classic Divided 
over the Proposed Hardfork, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www 
.cryptocoinsnews.com/ethereum-classic-divided-proposed-hardfork/. 
 67. See Lulu Yilun Chen & Yuji Nakamura, Bitcoin Is Having a Civil War 
Right as It Enters a Critical Month, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2017), https://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/bitcoin-risks-splintering-as-civil-war-
enters-critical-month (stressing the opposite views of developers and miners). 
 68. Id.; see also Frances Coppola, The Fundamental Conflict at The Heart 
of Bitcoin, FORBES (July 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/
2017/07/26/the-fundamental-conflict-at-the-heart-of-bitcoin/2/#7ecd3d15aac7 
(stressing the traditional monetary conflict between value and liquidity); David 
Z. Morris, Bitcoin’s King Solomon Moment, SLATE (June 6, 2017), http://www 
.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/06/internal_conflict_could_spl
it_bitcoin_in_half.html (stressing consequences for the different participants, 
including blockchain applications with different business models). Contra 
Samson Mow, The Bitcoin Cash Fork Was a Dangerous Trick, FORTUNE (Aug. 
7, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/07/bitcoin-cash-bch-hard-fork-blockchain-
usd-coinbase/; Jake Smith, The Bitcoin Cash Hard Fork Will Show Us Which 
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showed again how the deficit in formal governance structures 
was decided by a hard fork, disciplining developers in the same 
way as the DAO incident suffered by Ethereum one year 
earlier.69 The Bitcoin Cash event suggests that hard forks may 
become a structural and recurrent feature of these systems, 
somehow similar to hostile tender offers in the market for 
                                                          
Coin Is Best, FORTUNE (Aug. 11, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/11/bitcoin-
cash-hard-fork-price-date-why/ (defending the idea that “the split achieved the 
desirable outcome of allowing both visions of Bitcoin to compete in the free 
market.”). At the time of writing, Smith’s idea seemed to be winning the 
argument: the price of both coins combined was greater, and, even though 
Bitcoin prices had soared, Bitcoin Cash was the fourth cryptocurrency by 
market capitalization, equal to 7.48% of that of Bitcoin, and its price was 7.49% 
of that of Bitcoin (calculated on August 13, 2017 by the author with data 
obtained from https://coinmarketcap.com/; probably not fully informative given 
the relative lack of liquidity). Some days later, it had mined the first 8BM block 
but there were still some concerns about excessive concentration of miners. 
Josiah Wilmoth, The First 8MB Bitcoin Cash Block Was Just Mined, 
CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/first-
8mb-bitcoin-cash-block-just-mined/. The availability of the new coin did not 
satisfy all parties and yet another hard fork was expected to take place in 
November 2017. Anupam Varshney, Bitcoin Is Splitting Once Again—Are You 
Ready?, THE COIN TELEGRAPH (Aug. 18, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/
bitcoin-is-splitting-once-again-are-you-ready. However, the new coin was 
cancelled on November 8th. Mike Belshe, Segwit2x Final Steps, LINUX FOUND. 
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-segwit2x 
/2017-November/000685.html. In the following days, the price of Bitcoin fell 
while that of Bitcoin Cash soared, doubling its relative price to reach a 
maximum of 15.85% on November 10th (relying on prices given by 
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies). 
 69. Even if there have been few hard forks, the ones that have taken place 
illustrate that they may end up with different outcomes. In 2014, the MintPal 
exchange suffered a hack that led to two million USD in VeriCoin tokens being 
stolen. Subsequently, developers reclaimed the funds by what is said to be the 
first hard fork. Clay Michael Gillespie, VeriCoin Developer Speaks with CCN on 
MintPal Hardfork, CRYPTOCOIN NEWS (July 15, 2014), https://www 
.cryptocoinsnews.com/vericoin-developer-speaks-ccn-mintpal-hardfork/. Also in 
2014, after Nxt had suffered a 1.75 million USD theft, developers also proposed 
a hard fork, but it was rejected. Most of the funds were recovered through 
negotiations but only after paying ransom to the hacker. Brandon Hurst, $1.75 
Million Hack Raises Prospect of Hard Fork: A Price Not Worth Paying (Oct. 31, 
2014), https://bitcoinblog.de/2014/10/31/1-75-million-hack-raises-prospect-of-
hard-fork-a-price-not-worth-paying/. It has been alleged that the different 
outcomes were aligned with the different causes of the hacking and, 
consequently, the merits of the cases. Clay Michael Gillespie, VeriCoin 
Developer: “The NXT Chain Should Not Be Rolled Back”, CRYPTOCOIN NEWS 
(Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/vericoin-developer-believe-
nxt-chain-rolled-back/. Bitcoin itself forked in 2010 after someone minted 
billions of bitcoins but, given that the network was still small, it was easily 
handled without much difficulty. Id. 
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takeovers or corporate control. Note that takeovers also often 
end up redirecting and splitting the assets involved, so that the 
takeover market also provides a discrete, competitive, market-
led solution, alternative to the institutional, continuous, and 
evolutionary decision-making provided by formal corporate 
governance through, for example, corporate boards, proxy fights 
and general shareholders’ meetings.70 (On the contrary, hard 
forks launched to reverse an allegedly fraudulent transaction 
may, at least sometimes, be closer to a bank bailout, especially 
if developers, miners, and investors have close ties or are even 
the same persons, so that they all share a vested interest in 
reversing the transaction.)71 
                                                          
 70. One may interpret from this governance perspective the concerns. See, 
e.g., Kathleen Breitman, Why Ethereum’s Hard Fork Will Cause Problems in the 
Coming Year, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (Feb. 3, 2017), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/
articles/op-ed-why-ethereums-hard-fork-will-cause-problems-coming-year/ 
(stating, in essence, “hard forks are not effective for evolutionary change”). 
However, no doubt hard forks act as a disciplinary device for lead developers: 
In a sense, the lead developers are leading the parade. They’re out in 
front, marching, and the parade will generally follow them when they 
turn a corner. But if they try to lead the march down a disastrous 
route, then the parade members might decide to go in a different 
direction. The lead developers can urge the community on, but they 
don’t have formal power to force people to follow them if they take the 
system in a technical direction that the community doesn’t like. 
NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 171. How effective they may be in this 
disciplinary task remains an open question. Most likely, as many market-driven 
processes, competition among participants will be a major determinant of 
overall efficiency. Similarly, as in the takeover market, collisions between 
efficiency objectives and distributional concerns are bound to arise: positive 
size-of-the-pie effects may well coexist with exploitation of the least-informed 
participants. C.f., e.g., Gregg Jarrell & Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects 
of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371, 
373 (1980). Similarly, the distribution of value gains may affect the incentives 
to launch hard-fork initiatives, in a similar manner to the effect that takeover 
rules, e.g., sharing takeover premiums, have been claimed to exert on the 
likelihood of takeovers. Id. 
 71. See Frances Coppola, A Painful Lesson for the Ethereum Community, 
FORBES (July 21, 2016, 1:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola 
/2016/07/21/a-painful-lesson-for-the-ethereum-community/#1b2f26cabb24 
(“[T]he Ethereum central bank has directly recapitalized the DAO commercial 
bank by monetizing its debts.”). The whole series of incidents also suggests that 
Bitcoin may in fact be more “regulated” or at least “governed” than is sometimes 
claimed. Contra, Gur Huberman, Jacob D. Leshno & Ciamac Moallemi, 
Monopoly Without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment 
System, BANK FIN. RES. DISCUSSION PAPERS 36 (Sept. 5, 2017), https://helda 
.helsinki.fi/bof/bitstream/handle/123456789/14912/BoF_DP_1727.pdf. To 
understand its governance, one needs at least to consider the role played by code 
developers and allegedly concentrated miners. 
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B. CONTRACT COMPLETION IN SMART CONTRACTS 
These cases teach some important general lessons. 
Furthermore, being controversial, they show the tensions and 
tradeoffs that the technology involves, which may be more 
informative than the usual summary of business models so 
common in the literature. 
First, the tensions observed resemble the traditional conflict 
between the blind and automatic application of formal legal 
principles that should enable impersonal transactions and their 
nuanced qualification through exceptions based on principles of 
equity, good faith, or notice, which introduce a personal and 
often even political element and, as a consequence, are more 
suitable for personal exchange.72 
Second, as in other attempts to enable impersonal exchange, 
it makes sense to argue for contract simplicity. For instance, the 
root of the DAO problem was that smart contracts face a tradeoff 
between security and complexity,73 and the uncertain and 
changing environment emphasizes the need for adaptation. 
Furthermore, errors in computer code are prevalent and 
                                                          
 72. This conflict is visible in this summary of the pros and cons involved in 
the DAO incident: 
Users that did not support the hard fork point out that: code is law—
the original statement of The DAO terms and conditions should stand 
under any circumstances; things that happen on the blockchain are 
immutable and they should never change regardless of what the 
outcome is; there is a slippery slope and once you modify/censor for one 
course/reason there is not a lot to keep you from doing it for other 
contracts; the decision to return the money is short sighted and you 
might reduce the value of ETH down the line based on your decision to 
act now; [and], this is a bailout. Users that supported the hard fork 
argued the code is law is too drastic of a statement at the current time 
and humans should have the final say through social consensus; the 
Hacker could not be allowed to profit from the exploit as it is ethically 
wrong and the community should intervene; the slippery slope 
argument is not valid as the community is not beholden to past 
decisions, people can act rationally and fairly in each situation; it 
would be problematic to leave such a big piece of the Ether supply in 
the hands of a malicious actor and it might harm the value of Ether 
down the line; this is not a bailout as you are not taking money from 
the community, it is just a return of funds to the original investors; it 
would stop an ongoing war between the white-hat hackers and the 
hacker that would demoralize the community; the exploit was big 
enough to take action and reverse it; [and], if the community acts now 
it will make people that are unethical think twice before they use 
Ethereum as their platform of choice. 
What is Ethereum Classic, supra note 37 (punctuation modified by the author). 
 73. See Shea, supra note 39. 
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impossible to eradicate, and they increase with complexity,74 as 
with conventional contracts. Moreover, once a smart contract is 
implemented, it is not under the control of its creator, unless the 
power to change the code is allocated to a “master,” with obvious 
centralization.75 Automatic contracts therefore need to use 
simple computer code (some platforms meet this demand for 
simplicity by running most of the logic off the chain and having 
it upgraded by the majority of the parties76). A related point is 
made by Abramowicz in terms of the judgment that may be 
needed to “complete” contracts: “until computer programs can 
exhibit general artificial intelligence, they will lack judgment. 
They will not, for example, be able to determine whether vague 
contract provisions have been satisfied. Cryptocurrencies cannot 
solve the problem of incomplete contracts, and as long as 
contracts are incomplete, humans will need to resolve 
ambiguities.”77 
The role of simplicity and the scope for ex ante completion 
help to explain why blockchain seems to be gaining more ground 
                                                          
 74. See Joshua Bloch, Extra, Extra—Read All About It: Nearly All Binary 
Searches and Mergesorts are Broken, GOOGLE RES. BLOG (June 2, 2006), https:// 
research.googleblog.com/2006/06/extra-extra-read-all-about-it-nearly.html, for 
an interesting example. It is said that “[o]n average, software comes with 
between 15 and 50 defects per 1,000 lines of code.” Not-So-Clever Contracts, 
supra note 37. 
 75. See Shea, supra note 39 (“[O]nce a smart contract is implemented, it 
takes on a life of its own and the code cannot be changed unless it is created 
with a ‘master’ or set of masters who can change the code.”). 
 76. For instance, in the case of Blockstack, by (1) “[encoding] minimal logic 
on the blockchain,” which would “[o]nly define the parties involved in the 
agreement and allow them to jointly hold assets and authorize transfers”; (2) 
“[creating] a code agreement that all parties run off of the chain,” with 
communication channels where parties can sign distribute, vote and upgrade 
the code agreement; and, (3) “have the parties run code off of the chain . . . [and] 
submit transfer requests” which go through when accepted by a majority of 
parties running the code. Shea, supra note 39 (emphasis added). For further 
development of the proposal, see Muneeb Ali & Ryan Shea, A Token Mechanism 
for Growing the Blockstack Ecosystem of Decentralized Applications, 
BLOCKSTACK TOKEN (Oct. 26, 2017), https://blockstack.com/tokenpaper.pdf. 
 77. Abramowicz, supra note 48, at 362 (citation omitted). On this basis, 
Abramowicz argues that bitcoin is not really a system of peer-to-peer 
governance. First, given its limited scope of decisions and, in particular, the fact 
that such decisions involve no judgment: “It is an institution, however, that can 
resolve only one type of decision: whether purported transfers of Bitcoins will 
be validated and added to a list of approved transfers, known as the block 
chain.” Id. at 361. Moreover, “[it] is coordinated in the same centralized manner 
as other open source projects.” Id. at 367. 
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in the financial world and, in particular, in such areas as 
payments and even derivatives trading,78 which are already 
quite standardized and in fact deal with legal commodities. 
Obviously, contractual and property simplicity are negatively 
correlated to the value of transactions: for low-value 
transactions, complex contracts are too costly to write and 
enforce, and low-value assets are not valuable enough to define 
multiple rights on them. Understandably, blockchain and smart 
contracts also develop more easily in low-value contexts.79 
Lastly, blockchain clearly adds value by providing 
verifiability on the content of contractual documents. However, 
it is less clear to what extent or in which cases it is able to make 
contractual performance verifiable by third parties or even make 
verification unnecessary, except for very abstract and extremely 
formalized contracts. Therefore, consequences of blockchains on 
relational contracts are likely to be small, if by “relational” we 
mean contracts that are completed by the parties ex post, 
sometime in the future after they committed to the contract.80 
The contract was left incomplete because it would have been 
inefficient or even impossible to complete it. Verifiability of the 
contractual content (where blockchain probably enjoys its 
stronger comparative advantage) seems just a tiny element to 
substantially affect these tradeoffs. 
On the other hand, blockchains could seemingly have a 
greater effect on the functioning of relational contracts, when by 
“relational” we mean an exchange safeguarded by reputation or 
the expectation of future trade gains, in a way the opposite of 
impersonal exchange.81 
                                                          
 78. See, e.g., INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N (ISDA), THE FUTURE OF 
DERIVATIVES PROCESSING AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 23 (2016), 
https://www2.isda.org/attachment/ODcwMA==/Infrastructure%20white%20pa
per.pdf (arguing that blockchain holds great potential in the derivatives 
industry and advising to develop mechanisms to designate blockchain records 
as final as early in the transaction lifecycle as possible). 
 79. ALLENS LINKLATERS, supra note 30, at 14–15. 
 80. C.f. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985). In a sense, 
Shea’s proposed code agreement would place the relational element outside the 
blockchain. Ali & Shea, supra note 76. 
 81. C.f. Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in 
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981) 
(“[E]conomists . . . have long considered ‘reputations’ and brand names to be 
private devices which provide incentives and assure contract performance in 
the absence of any third-party enforcer”); Carl Shapiro, Premiums for High 
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In this context, we must distinguish two types of blockchain 
applications: 
First, applications enabling business-business (B2B) 
transactions could rely on “private” or “permissioned” systems, 
which are open only to preapproved users and in which the 
consensus may be driven by a previously established set of 
nodes.82 In this vein, private blockchains should expand rapidly 
in supply chain management, revamping the existing and mostly 
closely-knit networks of suppliers, manufacturers, and 
distributors, which are already characterized by phenomena 
such as “contract manufacturing,”83 as well as “virtual 
integration.”84 Financial institutions are pioneers in this 
regard.85 However, from the perspective of blockchain, these 
                                                          
Quality Products as Returns to Reputations, 98 Q.J. ECON. 659, 659–60 (1983) 
(“[R]eputation formation is a type of signaling activity . . . the faithful strategy 
involves foregoing the opportunity to earn profits through quality reductions.”). 
 82. See Vitalik Buterin, On Public and Private Blockchains, ETHEREUM 
BLOG (Aug. 7, 2015), https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-
private-blockchains/ (describing the comparative advantages of public and 
private blockchains). 
 83. Benito Arruñada & Xosé Henrique Vázquez, When Your Contract 
Manufacturer Becomes Your Competitor, HARV. BUS. REV. 135, Sept. 2006, 
https://hbr.org/2006/09/when-your-contract-manufacturer-becomes-your-
competitor. See also IBM INST. FOR BUS. VALUE, FAST FORWARD: RETHINKING 
ENTERPRISES, ECOSYSTEMS AND ECONOMIES WITH BLOCKCHAINS (2016), 
https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=GBE03757USEN 
(describing the effects of blockchain on organizational structure). 
 84. Benito Arruñada, The Quasi-Judicial Role of Large Retailers: An 
Efficiency Hypothesis of Their Relation with Suppliers, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
CONTRACTS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS 337 (Eric Brousseau & Jean-Michel 
Glachant eds., 2002). A prominent example is that of Wal-Mart. See, e.g., Kim 
S. Nash, Wal-Mart Turns to Blockchain for Tracking Pork in China, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 19, 2016, 4:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/10/19/wal-mart-turns-
to-blockchain-for-tracking-pork-in-china/. 
 85. According to the CEO of IBM, “Financial institutions are becoming 
early adopters: The World Economic Forum estimates that 80% of banks are 
working on blockchain projects.” Ginni Rometty, How Blockchain Will Change 
Your Life: The Technology’s Potential Goes Way Beyond Finance, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 7, 2016, 7:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-blockchain-will-
change-your-life-1478564751. “Having initially been sceptical [sic] about 
[blockchain technology] because of worries over fraud, banks are now exploring 
how they can exploit the technology to speed up back-office settlement systems 
and free billions in capital tied up supporting trades on global markets.” Martin 
Arnold, Big Banks Plan to Coin New Digital Currency: Group of Major Lenders 
Seeks Industry Standard for Settlements, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), https:// 
www.ft.com/content/1a962c16-6952-11e6-ae5b-a7cc5dd5a28c. However, there 
are more general initiatives such as MultiChain, which “helps organizations to 
build and deploy blockchain applications with speed,” use managed 
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systems will face a basic contradiction: the smaller the network, 
the smaller the extent and the fewer the advantages of 
decentralization, and the easier it may be to manipulate it.86 
They may therefore end up with little decentralization, little 
disruption, and even some risk of collusion among incumbents. 
The advantage of blockchain in making the content of contracts 
(as opposed to contractual performance) verifiable might make it 
unsuitable for contracts which, on purpose, are not formalized in 
order to ensure self-enforcement.87 
Second, the comparative advantage of blockchain 
applications would be considerably enhanced if the technology 
fulfills its promise of enabling individual users to own and keep 
full control of their historical record of transactional data, which 
is now in the hands of third-party centralized data silos (such as 
Google, Facebook or Booking). Availability and ownership of 
transactional data would make it possible for individuals to, 
first, accumulate reputational capital; and, then, deploy such 
capital to safeguard their transactions across multiple markets 
and relying on different applications. The system could benefit 
from massive economies of scale and scope, and could achieve 
secure personal transactions with anonymous parties, therefore 
providing an effective alternative to impersonal (i.e., meaning 
asset-based) exchange. Difficulties are numerous, however. For 
                                                          
permissions, which allows organizations to “[d]ynamically control who can 
connect, send and receive transactions, create assets, streams and blocks.” 
MULTICHAIN: OPEN SOURCE PRIVATE BLOCKCHAIN PLATFORM, http://www 
.multichain.com/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). The chain is therefore “as open or 
as closed as you need.” Id. The big question on private blockchain: What is its 
comparative advantage with respect to existing systems for data management? 
A preliminary answer rests on the additional capabilities provided by its peer-
to-peer distributed structure, which should at least reduce the risks inherent in 
centralized control present even in vertically integrated structures due to 
agency problems. 
 86. See, e.g., NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 34–38 (explaining a type 
of blockchain manipulation and confirming the role of honest nodes in 
preventing the success of a manipulation attempt). 
 87. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using 
Formal Contracts to Support Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 5 
WIS. L. REV. 981, 1019–32 (2016) (listing eighty-nine quotations from various 
companies regarding their approach to certain aspects of agreements and 
contracting). In Europe, this seems to affect even large recurrent transactions. 
For instance, it has been common practice for some big retailers and their main 
suppliers of consumer goods to write, but not sign, detailed and long contracts 
to organize their continuous relationships—allegedly to impede judicial 
interference (according to private conversations with practitioners). 
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instance, reaching such economies without some type of 
centralization, and—what may be the same—making the 
necessary investments without any possibility of capturing 
value in the future. 
IV. BLOCKCHAIN AND PROPERTY, IN REM, RIGHTS 
A. THE NEED FOR INTERFACES BETWEEN PERSONAL AND REAL 
RIGHTS 
One of the key attributes of a public ledger currency 
platform is “a protocol for sending, receiving, and recording 
value securely using cryptographic methods . . . .”88 A key 
question is to what extent, in addition to exchanging value, these 
systems are capable of exchanging property in rem rights.89 
Exaggerated but conveniently imprecise claims are common—
for instance, one of the authors of the Walport Report asserted 
that “[u]npermissioned ledgers can be used as a global record 
that cannot be edited: for declaring a last will and testament, for 
example, or assigning property ownership.”90 
In fact, however, even most of the pioneer agents doing 
simple transactions, such as trading in Bitcoin, rely at least on 
intermediaries such as exchanges (digital marketplaces)91 and 
                                                          
 88. David S. Evans, Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other Decentralized 
Public-Ledger Currency Platforms 1 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 685, 2014), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi 
/viewcontent.cgi?article=2349&context=law_and_economics. 
 89. Compare Merrill & Smith, supra note 3 (discussing various aspects and 
criticisms of the numerus clausus principle, which holds that property rights 
need to conform to a closed number of standardized forms), with Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 3 (disagreeing with Merrill and Smith’s analysis, 
discussing requirements for the establishment of property rights, and setting 
out conditions to be used in assessing the efficiency of alternative property 
rights regimes). 
 90. Simon Taylor, Definitions, in DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: 
BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra note 1, at 17 (emphasis added). 
 91. To users, they perform the same functions as banks (accept deposits in 
exchange for a mere promise to return them later, make payments, exchange 
electronic and fiat currencies, transfer funds, match clients, etc.) but also suffer 
similar risks, including bank runs, Ponzi schemes, and hacks, which are the 
electronic equivalent of break-ins. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 88–94. 
Before 2013, exchanges had experienced a failure rate of forty-five percent 
according to a study. Id. at 90. They also act as organized markets, in a similar 
way to organized fiat currency exchanges, even if users can disintermediate 
them to trade directly with other users. Id. at 99. 
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wallets (digital storage services).92 Even if such intermediaries 
have often been insecure,93 suffering frequent fraudulent 
attacks,94 their presence is not necessarily bad.95 Even though, 
as blockchain partisans rightly point out, specialized 
enforcement and, in general, intermediation, entail agency costs, 
they enjoy the advantages of specialization.96 Economic growth 
is based on efficiently trading off specialization advantages and 
agency costs. 
In more complex blockchain applications, in which parties 
trade claims on assets existing outside the blockchain ledger, 
                                                          
 92. The importance of these interfaces can also be seen in the need for peer-
to-peer organizations and, in particular, banks, to own real assets in order to 
develop a valuable reputation, and therefore to be recognized as a legal person: 
The obstacle [of cryptocurrency banks], however, is solely a legal one: 
a fully functional bank must be able to own real assets because a 
primary function of a bank is to invest funds. A peer-to-peer institution 
could own assets only if the legal system recognized the peer-to-peer 
institution as legitimately existing and having a form of personhood 
sufficient for the ownership of property. Real property purchased by a 
trust, for example, might be held in the name of the public key or in 
the name of the cryptocurrency as a whole. 
Abramowicz, supra note 48, at 413. 
 93. For Bitcoin, the blockchain itself has been resilient but the wallets and 
exchanges have not: “[U]sing hacker-proof bitcoin requires going through 
intermediaries such as exchanges to convert real-world currency into crypto-
cash, and ‘wallets’ to store it. These have proved anything but secure, which 
arguably defeats the purpose of bitcoin’s trust-free world.” Blockchain: The Next 
Big Thing, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015) [hereinafter Blockchain: The Next 
Big Thing], http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21650295-or-it-
next-big-thing. See also Jamie Redman, The Bitcoin Exchange Thefts You May 
Have Forgotten, BITCOIN NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/bitcoin-
exchange-thefts-forgotten/ (describing a subset of the approximately fifty most 
important exchange thefts up to January 2017). 
 94. See Izabella Kaminska, Bitcoin Bitfinex Exchange Hacked: The 
Unanswered Questions, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content 
/1ea8baf8-5a11-11e6-8d05-4eaa66292c32 (discussing a recent bitcoin exchange 
hack, listing a set of recent and significant thefts from bitcoin exchanges, and 
mentioning frequency of high profile hacking incidents since 2009). This 
supports the argument by Evans: “Current claims that public ledger platforms 
can conduct financial transactions more efficiently ignore the inefficiencies 
associated with the incentive and governance systems and the likely costs 
associated with regulation of these platforms and complementary service 
providers such as vaults, wallets, and exchanges.” Evans, supra note 88. 
 95. An obvious example of the value of intermediaries is that, without a 
central administrator, blockchain systems are “unforgiving: there is no 
helpdesk to reset a lost password . . . .” Blockchain: The Next Big Thing, supra 
note 93. 
 96. See Evans, supra note 88 (mentioning the costs associated with 
regulation and complementary services providers like exchanges). 
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these interfaces between the digital and the real worlds 
resemble the traditional interface between contractual (in 
personam) and property (in rem) rights.97 With the exception of 
systems purely based on possession, contracting property 
requires at least one intermediary (a registry or a court) between 
the world of mere claims (i.e., in personam rights) and the real 
world of in rem rights.98 For example, in land law, two 
contradictory chains of title deeds could survive for a long time, 
but (1) at any point in time at most one individual is holding 
possession of the claimed right on the specific real asset; (2) most 
importantly, for upgrading one of the claims in a right with in 
rem consequences, what is needed is a third-party enforcer 
representing the interests of all potential rightholders and not 
only the interests of those in the chain of title—a crucially 
important aspect for blockchain applications.99 Note that, in a 
                                                          
 97. The Cuber initiative involving an Estonian bank provides an example 
of the in personam nature of the rights acquired by users with respect to the 
intermediaries: 
The bank [LHV] enters the color identities into the code of the 
cryptocurrency Bitcoin. LHV guarantees the asset value of the 
particular pieces of Bitcoin whomever owns them. In their case the 
pieces of cryptocurrency represent Euro. When someone performs a 
transaction in Euro in Cuber, the properties of the color-coded 
cryptocurrencies are transferred so that they represent a Euro value 
with a new owner. The value of the Bitcoin currency in this context is 
completely uninteresting. The cryptocurrency is used as a way to store 
information, and LHV determines what this information represents in 
terms of value. This is not very different from the activity of a bank. 
The bank is currently responsible for what the digital codes in their 
databases represent in terms of value, which they also reconcile with 
central banks, markets, and so forth. 
KEMPE, supra note 24, at 19. See also CUBER, http://www.cuber.ee/en_US/ (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2016) (Cuber home page). 
 98. See, e.g., Benito Arruñada, The Titling Role of Possession, in LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 207, 211 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015) (discussing 
judges’ possible adjudicatory approaches to a hypothetical property dispute 
involving both in rem and in personam rights). See generally LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015) (presenting analyses 
of various aspects of possession). 
 99. A pioneer developer of applications for land registries, Factom, put it 
this way: 
Bitcoin, land registries, and many other systems need to solve a 
fundamental problem: proving a negative. They prove some “thing” has 
been transferred to one person, and prove that thing hasn’t been 
transferred to someone else. While proof of the negative is impossible 
in an unbounded system, it is quite possible in a bounded system. 
Cryptocurrencies solve this problem by limiting the places where 
transactions can be found. Bitcoin transactions can only be found in 
the Bitcoin blockchain. If a relevant transaction is not found in the 
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sense, a chain of paper title deeds is also “virtual,” as it reflects 
mere claims;100 therefore, if parties to the contract agree, it can 
support trade without necessarily having any real effect in terms 
of the traded assets that it purports to represent. 
This account is consistent with analyses of blockchain 
applications in “smart property” that use examples in which they 
are in fact describing transfers of possession instead of transfers 
of ownership—for instance, the running example of a “car whose 
ownership is controlled through a block chain” used in chapter 
eleven of Narayanan et al.,101 immediately turns out to be a 
transfer of possession: 
The block chain transaction doesn’t merely represent a change in 
ownership of the car: it additionally transfers actual physical control 
or possession of the car. When a car is transferred this way the earlier 
owner’s key fob stops working and the new owner’s key fob gains the 
ability to open the locks and start the engine. Equating ownership 
with possession in this way has profound implications.102 
The implications are indeed profound but they are achieved 
by transforming ownership into possession—that is, by 
enforcing only a single right in the asset. The price being paid is 
huge: the modern economy is based on the specialization (or, 
some would say, separation) of ownership and control (that is, in 
its simplest sense, possession). If blockchain’s smart property is 
limited to possessory rights, the word “merely” in the preceding 
quotation should be excised and the word “additionally” replaced 
by “only”. In practical terms, this limits stand-alone (no trusted 
third parties) applications of smart property to low-value assets, 
                                                          
blockchain, it is defined from the Bitcoin protocol perspective not to 
exist and thus the BTC hasn’t been sent twice (double spent). 
FACTOM, BUSINESS PROCESSES SECURED BY IMMUTABLE AUDIT TRAILS ON THE 
BLOCKCHAIN 5 (2014) (emphasis added), https://github.com/FactomProject 
/FactomDocs/blob/master/Factom_Whitepaper.pdf?raw=true. 
 100. The “chain” in “blockchain” comes about from the fact that each block 
is linked cryptographically to previous blocks. Jeremy Clark, Foreword to 
NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at XXI. This linkage resembles the links in 
the chain of title deeds used to provide evidence on property transactions, but 
in the case of title deeds there is a legal linkage between successive grantors 
and grantees. In a sense, it is closer to the physical indenture of medieval 
documents executed in two or more copies with edges correspondingly severed 
as a means of identification. 
 101. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 272 (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. at 274 (emphasis added). 
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as Narayanan et al. themselves seem to conclude a few pages 
later.103 
In one respect, the decision system used by the blockchain 
seems closer to the one applied in property law to real property 
than to bank or cash money: blockchain decisions are based on 
gathering users’ consents, and this may look similar to the 
transfer of ownership in real property, where the consent of 
rightholders is required to transfer in rem rights.104 If S 
transfers to B a right held in rem by O, S may acquire an in 
personam claim against B but does not in any way affect O’s 
right. Similarly, transferring bitcoins requires a consensus of 
verifiers to validate the hashes. (In contrast, in a bank transfer 
it is only the banks involved who certify the transfer, while cash 
changes hands by merely transferring the possession of the bills. 
Cash transfers do not even leave a record: parties are constantly 
solving the “who owns what” question without relying on a 
formal “enforcement apparatus” except for the simple transfer of 
possession. Bitcoin is similar to cash in also being a bearer 
instrument,105 but with records and an element of consent.) 
Nevertheless, there are two fundamental differences 
between the systems for gathering consents in blockchain and 
property. First, blockchain users are more like observing 
spectators than rightholders; therefore, their incentives are not 
necessarily well aligned. Second, not all rightholders in the real 
assets are blockchain users; therefore, any purging procedure 
would require additional mechanisms to ensure that the 
interests of these rightholders are represented. In rem rights 
require all rightholders to grant their consent, not only those 
listed in a paper-based chain of title deeds or in the blockchain. 
                                                          
 103. However, they are led to that conclusion more for the need of third-
party human judgment to complete transactions: 
The main advantage of smart property is the efficiency of ownership 
transfer, which can be done from anywhere at any time. For sales of 
items less valuable than a car (e.g., a smartphone or computer), 
disputes are unlikely to end up in court, and so nothing is lost in that 
regard. For such items, atomic transactions are a useful security 
feature. 
Id. at 284. 
 104. Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 401 (2003) [hereinafter Arruñada, Property Enforcement]; 
ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6. 
 105. Andreessen, supra note 16. 
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These are serious concerns when it is claimed that “any type 
of asset can be transferred using the blockchain”.106 The legal 
effects of such transfers, at least, would be limited to the 
transferring parties.107 Indeed, property rights are in the sphere 
of public ordering,108 and pure “privacy” is only viable when 
parties trade in contractual claims.109 As this has obvious 
welfare implications in terms of weaker enforcement,110 parties 
understandably demand in rem rights. Meeting this demand 
requires the intervention of a third party with a necessarily 
public function, as it must be impartial to all and prevail over 
the parties to any given contract.111 To start with, such a third 
party is necessary to define the set of legal rightholders and the 
mechanisms and evidentiary requirements for them to convey 
their consent with respect to intended transactions. It is 
revealing that blockchain initiatives often demand a more active 
role from governments in setting standards than in essence such 
a definition entails.112 
These concerns are also echoed in the caveats often 
introduced when foreseeing blockchain applications. For 
example, a famous entrepreneur claimed that 
Bitcoin gives us, for the first time, a way for one Internet user to 
transfer a unique piece of digital property to another Internet user, 
such that the transfer is guaranteed to be safe and secure, everyone 
knows that the transfer has taken place, and nobody can challenge 
the legitimacy of the transfer. The consequences of this breakthrough 
are hard to overstate.113 
Note, however, the “digital” adjective in the first sentence: 
one cannot send real property over the Internet or, more 
precisely, one cannot even transfer possession of real property 
over the Internet. A somehow similar caveat is introduced by 
Abramowicz when he considers the limitations of bitcoin: 
[W]hat makes Bitcoin remarkable is that it settles the most 
controversial issue—who owns wealth—without need for a law 
                                                          
 106. The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, supra note 14, at 20. 
 107. Abramowicz, supra note 48, at 365 (“Peer-to-peer law is most plausible 
as a mechanism of voluntary private ordering.”). 
 108. Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange, supra note 4. 
 109. Id.; Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from Property, supra note 4. 
 110. ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 18–24. 
 111. Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from Property, supra note 4, at 305; 
Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange, supra note 4. 
 112. See supra note 78 and accompanying text, on financial derivatives and 
infra Section IV.B, on the registration of legal organizations. 
 113. Andreessen, supra note 16 (emphasis added). 
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enforcement apparatus. Bitcoin can be seen not just as a currency, but 
more grandly as an institution that creates and enforces property 
rights. It is an institution, however, that can resolve only one type of 
decision: whether purported transfers of Bitcoins will be validated and 
added to a list of approved transfers, known as the block chain.114 
Note that the implicit meaning of “property rights” in the 
previous quotation is that of contract, in personam, rights. For 
the same reason, it is understandable that enforcement of peer-
to-peer decision systems is easier when they deal with digital 
resources being held in escrow. Not only the losing party is less 
effective in preventing enforcement but courts are unlikely to 
interfere because usually there are no claims by third parties. 
B. OTHER INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Additional aspects of blockchain can be enlightened by 
specific elements of the theory of property, in rem, rights. First 
is the distinction between initial and recurrent allocation of 
rights, which is a requirement for in rem rights.115 Blockchain 
discussion and initiatives are still too incipient to have suffered 
from the general proclivity in conventional property titling and 
administrative simplification to overemphasize the initial 
allocation of property rights with little attention being paid to 
their recurrent allocation.116 However, even in the implausible 
scenario that recurrent allocation could be produced in a safer 
manner within a blockchain-based technology, such a system 
would require at least two public interventions in order, first, to 
produce some sort of “first registration” (for property assets such 
as land and companies subject to public titling; less so for those 
others lacking it, such as diamonds); and, second, to define the 
blockchain as the only or at least a privileged source of judicial 
evidence for titling purposes. 
                                                          
 114. Abramowicz, supra note 48, at 361 (emphasis added). 
 115. Benito Arruñada, Property as an Economic Concept: Reconciling Legal 
and Economic Conceptions of Property Rights in a Coasean Framework, 59 INT’L 
REV. ECON. 121 (2012). In particular, 
property, in rem, rights are only transacted in a two-step procedure 
which includes a first step corresponding to the conventional private 
contracting between the parties, with effects of an in personam nature; 
and a second, relatively “public,” step which is capable of granting 
universal in rem effects because public authorities more or less 
explicitly represent the interests of all interested parties. 
Arruñada, Coase and the Departure from Property, supra note 4, at 313. 
 116. Arruñada, Property as Sequential Exchange, supra note 4. 
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In contrast, blockchain applications do follow the path of 
common efforts in property titling and administrative 
simplification in “paying scant attention to legal rights,”117 
despite this being the main determinant of enforceability and, 
therefore, economic value. This bias is highly visible in the 
diagnoses of traditional systems by blockchain entrepreneurs 
trying to apply the technology in the area of property titling, 
whose policy failures they narrowly attribute to poor data 
management; e.g., “[t]he failure of [traditional property registry 
software projects] to effect change can be traced to design flaws 
that ultimately leave them opaque to would be auditors while 
making the information they store overly pliable.”118 However, 
in reality, the main problem of property registries is not 
archiving information, but producing reliable information. That 
is, it is not a problem of keeping a record of perfectly “purged” 
property rights, but purging them and making sure that 
transactions are not contradictory with preexisting property 
rights and do not create new collisions of claims.119 Despite the 
fact that this is mainly a legal issue, not a technological issue, 
blockchain applications in property registration focus instead on 
archiving and on keeping the integrity of the information, 
disregarding how the information is produced and, especially, 
the whole process of how property rights are purged of 
contradictions. Moreover, if this purging is something for which 
blockchain is perhaps of little use,120 claims on the potential of 
the technology in this area should be substantially diluted.121 
                                                          
 117. Id. at 3; see also id. at 20–24. 
 118. Dobhal Abhishek & Matthew Regan, Immutability & Auditability: The 
Critical Elements in Property Rights Registries 3 (2016) (paper prepared for 
presentation at the 2016 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty). 
 119. For example, saying that “many of the potential benefits of utilizing the 
blockchain [for ‘land administration’] assume that a base layer of land 
information (titles, deeds, survey plans) exist and that the data is accurate” 
(Anand Aanchal, Matthew McKibbin, & Frank Pichel, Colored Coins: Bitcoin, 
Blockchain, and Land Administration 13 (2016) (draft of paper prepared for 
presentation at the 2016 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty)) comes 
close to assuming perfect information and seems, for the reason given in the 
text, inadequate. 
 120. As seemingly recognized when asserting that “[b]lockchain will not help 
to identify who has what right and to where. It will not resolve property rights 
disputes as properties are brought into the formal system. Most importantly it 
won’t resolve the tedious and time consuming process of collecting, verifying 
and bringing data into the system.” Id. at 3. 
 121. This may help to explain why projects stall soon after big and seemingly 
exaggerated announcements; for example, Honduras. Pete Rizzo, Blockchain 
2018] BLOCKCHAIN’S STRUGGLE 89 
 
A similar criticism is deserved by the Swedish inter-agency 
initiative to apply the blockchain to land conveyancing and 
registration, which considered that the main problems of the 
current Swedish Land Register were: 
that Lantmäteriet [Sweden’s land registry] is only involved in a few 
steps at the end of the real estate transactions. As a consequence of 
this the majority of the process is not transparent, in other words, 
visible to the public or other stakeholders. . . . that the system is slow 
at registering real estate transactions. The time between the signing 
a legally binding purchasing con-tract [sic] and when Lantmäteriet 
receives the bill of sale and make the approval of the title is often three 
to six months. . . . [and] that the issues above have resulted in sellers, 
buyers, banks and real estate agents being forced to create their own 
complex, red tape, processes for agreements between them since they 
have to make sure that things can’t go wrong, and because the value 
of the transactions is large.122 
However, these three points in fact deserve serious 
qualifications. 
First, it is not fully true that land registries are “involved in 
a few steps at the end of the real estate transactions”123 because 
they provide crucial information on possible conflicting claims 
from the beginning and during the whole contracting path. For 
instance, in step three of the conventional conveyancing process 
described by Kempe, the Swedish real estate “agent contacts 
Lantmäteriet and orders an excerpt from the real estate registry 
database in order to check the information about the property, 
i.e. that the seller is in fact the owner and can sell the 
property.”124 Similar contacts are made in steps ten and twenty-
one, before signing the purchasing contract and before the 
closing “to ensure that there aren’t any problems that would 
prevent the sale of the property,”125 and further contacts are 
made by banks in connection with mortgages at steps twenty-
five and twenty-seven.126 Moreover, there are costs and benefits 
                                                          
Land Title Project ‘Stalls’ in Honduras, COINDESK (Dec. 26, 2015, 3:31 PM), 
http://www.coindesk.com/debate-factom-land-title-honduras/. An anonymous 
commentator to Rizzo put this sharply in focus: “This is an example of some 
startup getting way ahead of themselves and declaring that just because they 
were talking to some government officials that made it ‘a deal with the 
Honduras government’. It’s like when startups have a bank account and then 
list the bank as their ‘partner.’” Id. 
 122. KEMPE, supra note 24, at 8–9. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 23. 
 125. Id. at 24. 
 126. Id. at 25. 
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associated with transparency. The tradeoff cannot always be 
assumed to be necessarily positive. 
Second, the typical complaint that the systems are “slow at 
registering real estate transactions”127 must be taken with a 
grain of salt, as most of the total time spent during the 
conveyancing of real estate is usually dedicated by parties to 
activities such as advertising, bargaining, surveying and 
inspecting properties, checking borrowers’ creditworthiness, 
etc.,128 activities that have little to do with the bureaucratic 
processes themselves. Consequently, two doubts emerge about, 
first, the time that is really spent in the bureaucratic steps that 
could therefore be shortened by the application of blockchain or 
other similar technologies; and, second, the economic value of 
such time savings. In other terms: for most transactions, 
shortening the time may have little value, especially when 
parties with an urgent need can effectively process the 
transaction in a much shorter time period. 
Lastly, it is an empirical question how much security is in 
fact provided by alternative systems, blockchain included, 
especially at the beginning. New systems always need a learning 
period for their weaknesses to be revealed, while old systems 
offer the advantage of having accumulated such knowledge over 
millions of previous transactions. 
V. ASSESSING BLOCKCHAIN APPLICATIONS IN 
PROPERTY 
The previous analysis provides a basis for ascertaining the 
potential of blockchain technology and building predictions 
about the areas of contractual and property transactions that 
will be most hospitable for blockchain applications, their 
expected impact, and any circumstances that may hinder or 
enable their development. 
I will now discuss the major issues in the area of property, 
broadly defined in order to cover the comparative advantage of 
different types of intermediaries and solutions, including the 
limitations and opportunities in the areas of property 
conveyancing and deed recordation, as well as company and 
property registration. 
                                                          
 127. Id. at 8. 
 128. See, e.g., id. at 23–25. 
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For a start, three cautionary notes are in order. First, 
remember the above-mentioned social element in property 
rights. Even Nick Szabo seems to be contemplating in personam 
rights when implementing his idea of property clubs: “Actually 
getting end users to respect the property rights agreed upon by 
this system will be dependent on the specific nature of the 
property, and is beyond the scope of the current inquiry.”129 
Certainly, he immediately asserts that “[t]he purpose of the 
replicated database is simply to securely agree on who owns 
what,”130 and this “securely agree” is essential to move from in 
personam to in rem. 
Second, decentralization is limited in the real world because 
individuals tend to misbehave with respect to security: 
We were able to achieve decentralization only because we equated 
possession with ownership—owning a car [the asset being taken by 
the authors as a running example] is essentially equivalent to 
knowing the private key corresponding to a designated transaction on 
a block chain . . . . If we reduce ownership to the problem of securing 
private keys, it raises the stakes for digital security, which is a 
difficult problem with humans being a weak link. Programmers have 
endeavored to write bug-free code for decades, but the challenge 
remains elusive. Designers of cryptosystems have tried for decades to 
get non-technical users to utilize and manage private keys in a way 
that resists both theft and accidental loss of keys, also with little 
progress. If the model of decentralization relies excessively on private 
keys, cars might get stolen by malware or in phishing attacks, and the 
loss of a key might turn your car into a giant brick. While there could 
be fallback mechanisms to cover these types of events, inevitably such 
mechanisms tend to lead us back toward intermediaries and 
centralized systems, chipping away at the benefits of the 
decentralized model that we were striving for.131 
This issue is present in all types of applications, but, 
understandably, it especially constrains those in which the 
stakes are higher, leading people to demand greater security. 
Lastly, misbehavior with respect to security is only an 
instance of a broader and deeper phenomenon: individual 
freedom has a price in terms of individual responsibility that not 
all individuals are always willing to pay. Instead, knowing their 
own weaknesses, they often trust more and prefer to rely on 
                                                          
 129. Nick Szabo, Secure Property Titles with Owner Authority, http://www 
.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwi
nterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/securetitle.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 
 130. Id. (emphasis added). 
 131. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 283. 
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centralized solutions based on private and public custodian 
agents.132 This preference for third-party custodians imposes a 
particularly serious constraint on property applications because 
the universal nature of property requires that the same rules be 
applied to all rightholders. In a hypothetical, fully-decentralized 
property system, all individuals would therefore be granting or 
denying their consent to all sorts of intended transactions that 
might affect their property rights. Consequently, they would 
become the only custodians not only of their cryptographic keys 
(to receive notice and grant consent) but also of the legal 
integrity of their rights. 
A. CONVEYANCING AND PROPERTY TITLING 
The impact of the blockchain on conveyancing and property 
titling will be affected by the basic characteristics of both legal 
processes, which, in line with the incentives of participants, are 
mostly private in conveyancing and intrinsically public in 
registration.133 In particular, they are defined by the fact that in 
all property systems parties are free to choose their lawyers, 
conveyers, and notaries public.134 On the contrary, third-party 
protection leads the law to universally restrict their choice of the 
office that records their titles or the registrar that preserves and 
reviews their rights, as well as the judge who presides over a suit 
of quiet title or any equivalent judicial procedure.135 Therefore, 
blockchain should find it easier to expand into notarization and 
data archiving,136 but will find it more difficult to replace 
centralized land registries, especially in jurisdictions such as 
Australia, England, Germany and Spain that have registries of 
                                                          
 132. Note that this option makes considerably more sense under realistic 
behavioral assumptions, while the game-theory analyses applied to developing 
blockchains often assume perfect rationality, which, when applied out of 
context, may easily lead to unjustified enthusiasm. 
 133. Arruñada, Property Enforcement, supra note 104, at 423–24. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 424–28. 
 136. Indeed, “distributed ledgers naturally lend themselves to implementing 
high-level services that involve notaries, time-stamping, and high-integrity 
archiving, and promise to lower the costs of these activities by increasing 
automation, enabling easy switching of service providers, and peer 
transactions.” U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER 
TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 8 (2016), supra note 1, at 47. Note, 
however, that conveyancing, notarization, and data archiving are already partly 
decentralized, because they do not generally rely on central operators but on 
independent professionals’ and parties’ databases. 
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rights, also often called “land registration” or “title by 
registration” systems.137 
First, to the extent that even in civil law jurisdictions 
notaries public are freely chosen by parties to private contracts, 
the blockchain will likely play a bigger role in notarization, even 
in real estate transactions.138 The only functions for which 
notaries used to be clearly superior were for identifying parties 
and, more clearly, for ascertaining their legal capacity and 
serving as providers of settlement, closing, and escrow services 
for the parties.139 These advantages, which for decades now have 
been under threat from complementary technological 
developments in identification and the related availability of 
registries for individuals’ legal capacities, are now substantially 
affected by blockchain, as it has allowed the development of 
services that provide authentication and authorization, proving 
to other parties that you are who you say (authentication) and 
that you have the required permissions (authorization).140 
                                                          
 137. For an analysis of the different types of land registries, see Arruñada, 
Property Enforcement, supra note 104, at 406–23. 
 138. See, for instance, in regard to the initiative being developed in the 
Republic of Georgia, Giulio Prisco, BitFury Announces Blockchain Land Titling 
Project with the Republic of Georgia and Economist Hernando De Soto, BITCOIN 
MAGAZINE (April 27, 2016, 10:56 AM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles 
/bitfury-announces-blockchain-land-titling-project-with-the-republic-of-
georgia-and-economist-hernando-de-soto-1461769012/. 
 139. Benito Arruñada, Market and Institutional Determinants in the 
Regulation of Conveyancers, 23 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 93 (2007), argues that even 
civil law notaries face insurmountable difficulties to effectively review the 
legality of private contracts, providing a uniform quality of review. The main 
reason is that third parties, not being party to such contracts, do not influence 
the choice of notary. Even where notaries are organized as a closed shop, free 
choice of notary by parties introduces competition among them and, 
consequently, the actual level of review is that of the weakest link in the whole 
network of notaries, as shown by the lower quality and increased fraud observed 
after the liberalization of notaries in The Netherlands. Francien Lankhorst & 
Hans Nelen, Professional Services and Organised Crime in the Netherlands, 42 
CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 163, 169–72 (2005). 
 140. For a nuanced analysis of the authentication and authorization 
requirements, specifically developed to compare legacy and electronic 
conveyancing and titling systems, see Rod Thomas et al., Australasian Torrens 
Automation, Its Integrity, and the Three Proof Requirements, 2013 N.Z. L. REV. 
227 (2013) and Rod Thomas et al., Designing an Automated Torrens System — 
Baseline Criteria, Risks and Possible Outcomes, 2015 N.Z. L. REV. 425 (2015). 
For an application to blockchain, see also Rod Thomas & Charlie Huang, 
Blockchain, the Borg Collective and Digitalisation of Land Registries, 2017 
CONV. 14 (2017). The case of the Estonian government is particularly 
interesting: 
94 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:1 
 
Likewise, with respect to settlement, trade implemented 
through a blockchain can now provide conditioned simultaneous 
enforcement by using the principle of “atomicity,” which, in 
essence, ensures that both parties fulfill their promises at the 
same time.141 
Second, the applicability to registries of a truly 
decentralized blockchain (i.e., without trusted intermediaries) 
will be more limited because they play a public legal function, 
protecting the interests of unrepresented third parties and 
                                                          
Since 2013, Estonian government registers — including those hosting 
all citizen and business-related information — have used Guardtime 
to authenticate the data in its databases. Their Keyless Signature 
Infrastructure (KSI) pairs cryptographic “hash functions” (see below) 
with a distributed ledger, allowing the Estonian government to 
guarantee a record of the state of any component within the network 
and data stores. . . .Using their ID card, citizens order prescriptions, 
vote, bank online, review their children’s school records, apply for state 
benefits, file their tax return, submit planning applications, upload 
their will, apply to serve in the armed forces, and fulfill around 3000 
other functions. . . . So how does a block chain help? It helps because 
every alteration of a piece of data is recorded. By providing proof of 
time, identity and authenticity, KSI signatures offer data integrity, 
backdating protection and verifiable guarantees that data has not been 
tampered with. It is transparent and works to the user’s benefit too: 
citizens can see who reviewed their data, why, and when; and any 
alterations to their personal data must be authorised. Moreover, 
through using hash functions, as opposed to asymmetric cryptography 
used in most PKI, KSI cannot be broken by quantum algorithms. It is 
also so scalable that it can sign an exabyte of data per second using 
negligible computational and network overhead. It removes the need 
for a trusted authority, its signed data can be verified across 
geographies, and it never compromises privacy[.] 
Alastair Brockbank, Case Study – Estonian Block Chains Transform Paying, 
Trading and Signing, in U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER 
TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra note 1, at 83. 
 141. This works in a similar manner to close a transaction: 
As long as the currency used for payment and the car ownership co‐
exist on the same block chain, Alice and Bob can form a single atomic 
transaction that simultaneously transfers ownership of the car and the 
payment for the car. Specifically, the transaction would specify two 
inputs: Alice’s ownership and Bob’s payment; and specify two outputs: 
the ownership to Bob and the payment to Alice. The transaction 
requires both parties to sign because both are providing inputs. If one 
signs and the other does not, the transaction is not valid. Once one 
party signs, the transaction details cannot be changed without 
invalidating the signature. Once the signed transaction is broadcast to 
the block chain, the car will wait for a preset number of confirmations 
(e.g., six) and then allow Bob access. Simultaneously, Bob’s payment 
to Alice will be confirmed. One cannot happen without the other. 
NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 274. 
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therefore being much more than mere public databases.142 
Centralization and monopoly in registries are not rooted mainly 
in economies of scale but in the enhanced neutrality (not only 
with respect to parties to the contract but also with respect to 
strangers to it) required to reach universal legal effects.143 
However, this does not preclude that smart contracts could be 
complementary to property and company registries in many 
ways. For instance, property registries would be affected by the 
ability of applications such as Ethereum not only to register and 
track property but also to define new types of property 
entitlements, including multiple ownership claims and asset-
sharing with sophisticated and nuanced allocations of use rights. 
In principle, moreover, when considering the impact of 
blockchain on property registries, it is sensible to at least 
distinguish between recorders of deeds, such as those of France 
or the USA, and registers of rights, such as the German 
Grundbuch or the Torrens system of title by registration 
operating in Australia.144 The latter not only date and keep the 
documents or “deeds” reflecting the transactions that the 
contractual parties agree to but also verify, as a necessary 
condition for entry into the register, that the intended 
transactions respect all other rightholders’ rights on the specific 
asset.145 
                                                          
 142. Describing a land registry as a ledger is somehow misleading. Land 
registries are not standard ledgers. Systems based on the recordation of deeds 
merely time-stamp and archive documents and are therefore closer to a simple 
ledger. They are also similar to blockchains in that, in principle, they keep a 
record of the whole history of transactions, without purging possible 
contradictions. However, the date of entry at the registry holds crucial legal 
consequences, allowing the record to provide evidence on the priority of legal 
claims. Registries of rights are even more complex: they provide a sort of legal 
“balance sheet” defining not mere personal claims but the socially-accepted 
rights on a specific property. The “ledger” terminology focuses on the numeric 
or accounting personal aspect, while the key element in registries is social and 
legal: they do not mainly contain magnitudes (values) but the socially-accepted 
legal evidence supporting claims (recording) or even establishing rights 
(registration). If careful attention is not paid to this issue, attempts to apply 
blockchain in this area easily fall prey of the GIGO (that is, “garbage in, garbage 
out”) principle. See, as an example, the account of the failed proposal to reform 
the land register of Honduras by Factom, provided by TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, 
supra note 14, at 193–95. See also Rizzo, supra note 121. 
 143. See, e.g., TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 14, at 194. 
 144. ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 55–67. 
 145. Id. 
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It is conceivable that a deed recordation system might be 
replaceable by an automatic system of dating private contracts 
and preserving their contents, if parties to private contracts 
cannot manipulate both functions once they sign their contract. 
However, even in that case, there is still a need for the law to 
establish the rules of evidence: to set the value of the blockchain 
as a source of evidence for in rem adjudication. For a blockchain 
to produce in rem effects, all parties must be obliged to express 
their will through it. Moreover, the law must trust those 
designing, putting in place, and—to some extent—governing, or 
at least affecting, the government of the blockchain system. 
The official report of the pilot project carried out in Cook 
County (Chicago, Illinois) concurs with this analysis,146 as it 
concludes that relying on an unpermissioned peer-to peer system 
would be too costly in terms of energy and would force most 
owners to rely on third parties,147 seemingly inclining the report 
towards permissioned systems and to emphasize the use of 
blockchain for conveyance and lodging, but retaining the 
existing legal framework according to which “the county 
                                                          
 146. See KAREN A. YARBROUGH, COOK COUNTY RECORDER OF DEEDS, 
BLOCKCHAIN PILOT PROGRAM FINAL REPORT 32–34 (2017), http://cookrecorder 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Final-Report-CCRD-Blockchain-Pilot-
Program-for-web.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2017). The firm developing the 
system seems more optimistic: Ragnar Lifthrasir, Permissionless Real Estate 
Title Transfers on the Bitcoin Blockchain in the USA! — Cook County 
Blockchain Pilot Program Report, MEDIUM (Jun. 28, 2017), https://medium.com 
/@RagnarLifthrasir/permissionless-real-estate-title-transfers-on-the-bitcoin-
blockchain-in-the-usa-5d9c39139292. A similar pilot, also limited to 
conveyancing, is reported by Matt Snow, How I Sold 5 Acres of Land Using 
BitBay’s Blockchain Smart-Contracts, MEDIUM (Oct. 19, 2017), https://medium 
.com/@tradersnow/how-i-sold-5-acres-of-land-using-bitbays-trustless-smart-
contracts-28f18b83125. 
 147. The report agrees with our previous judgment that insufficient 
individual responsibility in preserving cryptographic keys would lead to 
reliance on trusted third parties: 
The Colored Coins (tokenization) approach seems to be a secure 
method for transmitting information, but it is complicated and 
requires users to become highly educated on how the technology works, 
including extremely secure and encrypted means for storing the 
private keys. Though securing a real estate transaction behind a 
password or private key would be a great way to prevent unauthorized 
transfers of property, it is not a stretch to imagine that such a system, 
if it required token reuse, would result in more people losing their 
private keys and requiring (another) third party to sell them back their 
key or perform a recovery action in a multi-signature transaction (e.g., 
2 of 3 keys needed to sign). 
YARBROUGH, supra note 146, at 33. 
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government record is the only official record.”148 In a similarly 
minimalistic vein, it considers that “tokenizing” title would pose 
substantial new legal challenges149 and using digital signatures 
would facilitate secrecy and endanger the identification of 
participants.150 Moreover, most of the positive aspects 
highlighted by the report are not exclusive of blockchain, such 
as the possibility of combining conveyance and recordation into 
a single event, using separate components of blockchain 
components to improve current recordkeeping practice (in 
particular, Cook County has decided to add file hashing and data 
integrity certification), consolidating property information 
currently spread across several government offices in a single 
website, and making fraud harder by protecting conveyances 
with cryptographic keys.151 
Blockchain may also lower the costs of identifying rights and 
assets, making new types of registers viable, enabling finely-
tuned solutions for more detailed rights in intellectual property 
and completely new registries for certain high-value assets, as 
suggested by the Everledger initiative for registering diamonds 
and other specially valuable assets.152 Note in this regard that 
private ordering arrangements enjoy an advantage when rights 
are unenforceable in rem, as with assets that are “easily 
portable, universally valuable and virtually untraceable,” such 
as diamonds, which explains why the diamond industry has been 
based on a “millennia-old distribution system that relied on 
multiple layers of personal exchange.”153 Blockchain would alter 
this advantage if it is capable of relaxing this constraint, so that 
it becomes economically viable to identify each individual asset, 
                                                          
 148. Id. at 22 (emphasis in original). 
 149. Id. at 39–40. 
 150. Id. at 38–39. 
 151. Id. at 34–38. 
 152. Natasha Lomas, Everledger Is Using Blockchain to Combat Fraud, 
Starting with Diamonds, TECHCRUNCH (June 29, 2015), https://techcrunch.com 
/2015/06/29/everledger/. 
 153. Barak D. Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and 
Globalisation: Peering into the Diamond Industry, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY 
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND THEORETICAL DEBATES ON 
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGES 31, 32 (Volkmar 
Gessner ed., 2009). 
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this being one of the stated objectives of the Everledger 
registry.154 
B. COMPANY REGISTRATION 
The case of company registries is similar to that of 
recordation of deeds, to the extent that most company registries 
are closer to recordation than to registration systems. However, 
company registries could be challenged by initiatives like the 
Ethereum blockchain, as these aim to create virtual 
decentralized and autonomous organizations that would be 
defined only by a given set of rules running in the blockchain. In 
principle, these organizations can be flexibly organized, 
allocating specialized managerial and contractual functions in 
different manners.155 However, a historical perspective throws 
light on the potential contribution and likely difficulties of this 
contractual approach to company incorporation. The experience 
of the English “unincorporated companies” prior to the creation 
of the English Company Registry in 1844 provides relevant 
insights.156 In general terms, they suggest that, even assuming 
perfect immutability of the blockchain, the explicit backing of 
the law and judicial rulings seem indispensable to avoid future 
conflict ex post and to provide parties with the necessary 
certainty ex ante. 
A less ambitious initiative is the development of an 
international standard for the identification of legal entities, 
known as the Register of Legal Organizations (ROLO).157 It is 
revealing that, despite being led by collaborative industry, given 
that most transactions are business-to-business (B2B), what is 
                                                          
 154. Lomas, supra note 152; see also U.K. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., 
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 8 (2016), supra 
note 1, at 56. 
 155. C.f. Abramowicz, supra note 48, at 414 (“The traditional forms of 
business association differ in how they allocate ownership interests and 
decision-making authority, but the peer-to-peer business association allocates 
decision-making authority in a new way—not to a specific owner, to partners, 
to a board, or even to shareholders, but to the peer-to-peer decision-makers as 
a whole.”). 
 156. See generally RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW (2000), for 
the historical evidence. For an interpretation along the lines of the text, see 
Benito Arruñada, Institutional Support of the Firm: A Theory of Business 
Registries, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 525, 558–62 (2010). 
 157. See Andrew Coakley, The Block Chain Network: Accelerating Adoption, 
SOPRA STERIA 5 (2016), http://www.slideshare.net/AndrewCoakley1/
blockchain-final-25112015-v11. 
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being considered is the need for ROLO “in each nation,”158 and 
the expected presence of a mandatory element. In particular, 
“enrolling into a ROLO at a Level of Assurance is voluntary; 
however, being in ROLO will become mandatory for future high 
assurance identity federation, cyber assurance and insurance 
requirements. It can also be expected to become mandatory for 
government contractors and companies in a number of regulated 
sectors.”159 In England, it has the support of Companies House, 
the English company register.160 
Blockchain implications are clearer in other corporate areas 
that are intrinsically contractual. For instance, blockchain has 
the potential to automatize transactions in the area of “corporate 
actions”: any announcements made by a public company 
affecting its securities and which may require an action by either 
investors or their representative agents. Examples include 
dividends and coupon payments, offers to issue or redeem 
securities,161 stock splits, mergers, and spin offs. Most of this 
data is communicated to investors through a complex channel 
involving suppliers of financial data, securities’ custodians, and 
investment fund managers, who then also carry investors’ 
decisions in the opposite direction.162 In both directions, 
blockchain could make the whole process much more efficient 
and automatic.163 
                                                          
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 6. 
 160. Id. (“ROLO’s design is being industry led and has gained some early 
support from a wide range of industries, including those already covered by 
Companies House (including Companies House itself).”). 
 161. Trading shares on a blockchain is legal in Delaware since July 2017. 
Michael del Castillo, Delaware House Passes Historic Blockchain Regulation, 
COINDESK (July 1, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/delaware-house-passes-
historic-blockchain-regulation/. 
 162. On the considerable costs and risks, both actual and potential, of these 
systems, see the report sponsored by the Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation and produced by Oxera. Corporate Action Processing: What Are the 
Risks?, OXERA i–ii (2004), http://www.oxera.com/Oxera/media/Oxera/
downloads/reports/Corporate-action-processing.pdf?ext=.pdf (estimating at one 
million the number of corporate actions worldwide, and further estimating the 
annual risk at between 1.6 and 8 billion Euros and annual actual losses at 
between 300 and 400 million Euros). 
 163. See Dominic Hobson, Case Study 2 — Corporate Actions, in 
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN, supra note 1, at 
58–59 (“In theory, [blockchain technology] could eliminate all intermediaries 
between the issuer and the fund manager, guaranteeing the accuracy and 
timeliness of the information.”). 
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C. PROPERTY REGISTRATION 
All registries of rights (often called “title” or simply 
“registration” systems) include a registry of documents in the 
form of their lodgment book, which they use to establish 
priorities before undergoing registration review. What has 
already been said about recordation systems applies to this part 
of registration systems. 
In addition, in comparison with property recordation and 
company registries, property registries of rights should be less 
affected by blockchain, to the extent that registration review 
cannot be easily exercised by an automatic system (even a 
centralized one): it would be facing similar difficulties to those 
considered above with respect to contractual completion. The 
standard historical solution when creating modern land 
registries has been to reduce the variety of rights enforceable in 
rem, defining a smaller and closed number of in rem rights (the 
“numerus clausus” principle),164 and to make property 
transactions more “abstract” (i.e., formal). This simplification of 
property rights is worthwhile to the extent that it makes it 
possible for registries of rights to function or, in general, reduces 
information asymmetries in markets.165 However, it may also be 
costly because a smaller set of rights benefits from the 
advantages of being enforced in rem. In this vein, the proposal 
to have part of the transaction “out of the blockchain” (as in 
Blockstack’s simple contracts, described in note 76) might end 
up creating a two-step transacting process broadly similar to the 
separation between the “causal” and “abstract” stages present in 
many legal systems but most clearly established in German 
property law.166 
                                                          
 164. See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 3; Hansmann & Kraakman, 
supra note 3; Arruñada, Property Enforcement, supra note 104. 
 165. For an empirical test of the role of the numerus clausus in different 
types of registries, see Arruñada, Property Enforcement, supra note 104, at 416–
23. 
 166. See Jürgen Kohler, The Law of Rights in Rem, in INTRODUCTION TO 
GERMAN LAW 227, 231 (Werner Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996) 
(describing how the principle of abstraction or Abstraktionsprinzip that is 
characteristic of German property law makes transactions concerning property 
rights formal and abstract, and showing how transactions take place by entry 
into the land register or Grundbuch and are valid irrespective of the validity of 
the causal obligation); see also Off-Chain Transactions, BITCOIN WIKI, 
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Off-Chain_Transactions (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) 
(explaining that the separation between on-chain and off-chain transactions—
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Moreover, in a fully decentralized system of property, all 
individuals would take care of their rights by themselves, as the 
rules of evidence used to establish title need to be the same for 
all parties holding rights in that type of asset. They would need 
to keep their cryptographic keys and to decide about any 
transaction that other individuals propose which might affect 
their rights. As mentioned previously, many individuals, 
probably the majority, prefer to rely, at least partly, on trusted 
private and institutional intermediaries. 
Proposals to apply blockchain in the registration of real 
property confirm this analysis. For instance, the above-
mentioned Swedish White Paper provides a valuable illustration 
as, in essence, it is limited to reorganizing the in personam 
contractual process precedent to the in rem property 
transaction. The changes proposed in Sweden thus resemble the 
“Landonline” system of electronic conveyancing and registration 
implemented in New Zealand since 2009,167 but with a key 
difference: the Swedish Land Register would at least initially 
retain all its powers to review and decide on registration: “In an 
initial stage, the database of Lantmäteriet remains intact. 
Updates to the land registry are retrieved from the blockchain 
and are then also checked by Lantmäteriet. Registration in the 
blockchain is digital and based on the legal requirements, which 
minimizes errors in the information.”168 Moreover, the land 
                                                          
used to speed them up, save fees and scale systems more easily—can be 
interpreted in this vein). 
 167. The changes proposed in Sweden are summarized at KEMPE, supra note 
24, at 27–31. See also Alex Mizrahi, A Blockchain-Based Property Ownership 
Recording System, CHROMAWAY, 2016, http://chromaway.com/papers/A-
blockchain-based-property-registry.pdf (discussing the challenges of 
“implementation of blockchain-bnased [sic] property ownership recording 
system[s]”); Blockchain and Future House Purchases: Second Phase Completed 
in March 2017, CHROMAWAY, http://chromaway.com/landregistry/ (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2016) (providing an interactive demonstration of a property purchase 
using blockchain technology). For a description and analysis of the New Zealand 
case, see Benito Arruñada, Leaky Title Syndrome?, 2010 N.Z. L.J. 115 (Apr. 
2010). For a more general discussion of electronic conveyance see ARRUÑADA, 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 208–15. 
 168.  KEMPE, supra note 24, at 33. As imagined, the interaction of the 
blockchain with the land registry would be minimal: 
The blockchain for the transactions is open source and is checked by 
Lantmäteriet, but can be verified by anybody. The chain of 
authorization, signing with a Telia ID, etc. can be edited. The 
blockchain saves the verification records of documents such as the bill 
of sale and the purchasing contract. Storing the original documents 
and their verification records can be performed by an external party, 
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register also defines the assets and (supposedly) the authority to 
deal: 
A central part of the practical application of blockchains is the 
identification of what the digital codes will represent in the physical 
world. As described above, it is LHV Bank, Lantmäteriet or someone 
else behind a solution that is the organization that determines what 
the digital codes represent and who is authorized to transfer or act in 
a contracts [sic]. In other words, Lantmäteriet guarantees which 
digital representation a specific property has.169 
Therefore, the only substantial change proposed in the 
White Paper seems to be the development of a seemingly private 
blockchain application for electronic conveyance, which would 
make it possible for all parties involved to work with the same 
information, expanding their knowledge and reducing 
duplications and mistakes.170 A benefit would be that, through 
the application, all parties would also have instant access to any 
filing in the register that may affect the legal standing of the 
rights being traded.171 
On the other hand, the system is planned to work with 
“pending property titles” during the whole conveyance process 
until eventual registration, which the White Paper hopes would 
always be granted by its assumption that registration refusals 
are now mainly caused by bureaucratic mistakes: “The risk that 
                                                          
but can also be stored digitally by each party in the agreement, the 
bank, buyer, seller, agent, etc. The documents and verification records 
are then stored in multiple locations, which creates redundancy. The 
verification records are also recorded in an external blockchain, which 
means that all of the parties can feel secure that they can re-create and 
demonstrate the chain of events on their own, in the event that the 
other parties suffer a breach of data or similar event. 
Id. Moreover, “the land registry of Lantmäteriet is, in principle, entirely 
separate from the solution.” Id. at 34. Some less ambitious projects only use the 
blockchain as a data depository for the current register. See, e.g., Ian Allison, 
Blockchain-Based Ubitquity Pilots with Brazil’s Land Records Bureau, INT. 
BUS. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/blockchain-based-
ubitquity-pilots-brazils-land-records-bureau-1615518. 
 169. KEMPE, supra note 24, at 22. For the related problem of guaranteeing 
who is authorized to transfer, this Swedish initiative seems to rely on mobile 
phone identification: 
Another central part is the identification of the actors who will have 
rights to act in the system. For this, a secure ID solution is required. 
This solution also needs to be easily accessible to the actors involved. 
If we look to the future, we see a world where mobile phones play an 
increasingly important part in the ID solutions being developed. 
Id. 
 170. Id. at 26. 
 171. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
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the property title will not be granted is sharply reduced since the 
system can ensure that the information that is required by law 
is included in the system and is required by the system in order 
for the parties to be able to provide their signature.”172 
However, even if most refusals have been rooted in 
bureaucratic errors, it is likely that the important refusals in 
terms of value and legal security will be those that impede 
dubious or even fraudulent transactions from damaging third 
parties.173 In principle, it is unclear how they would be affected 
by the new system. If this analysis is correct, two important 
consequences follow. First, what is mentioned above about the 
“initial” functions to be played by the land register in a 
supposedly transitional period would likely become a permanent 
feature of the system. Otherwise, there is a risk of inadvertently 
transforming a register of rights or registration-of-title system 
into a recordation-of-deeds system.174 Second, speeding up the 
whole process and maintaining the same level of legal security 
likely requires introducing at earlier stages an advanced 
registration review. The “pending” titles repeatedly mentioned 
in the White Paper would then be upgraded to “conditional” 
property titles. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON FIRMS, CONTRACTS 
AND PROPERTY 
Blockchain is said to be “trustless,”175 pointing out that it 
does not need trust to work. However, this trustless feature 
needs to be qualified. Blockchain and other institutional and 
physical technologies supporting more impersonal exchange in 
fact replace trust between counterparties with all parties’ trust 
towards some third-party intermediary, be it a register, an 
organized exchange, a bank, a credit card system, etc.176 
Blockchain enthusiasts claim that it gets rid of intermediaries 
but this claim proves illusory: it is more a Holy Grail than a 
                                                          
 172. KEMPE, supra note 24, at 32. 
 173. See, e.g., supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 174. ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 210–12. 
 175. See, e.g., Nikunj Jain, Blockchain: Why a Trust-Less System is the Most 
Trustable System in the World, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Apr. 21, 2017), 
https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/blockchain-trust-less-system-trustable-
system-world/. 
 176. See discussion supra note 36. 
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realistic objective.177 The paper shows the major roles played by 
different types of intermediaries. Their presence holds key 
consequences for specialization opportunities, firms’ strategies, 
and the structure of contracting and property processes: 
First, blockchain applications will tend to rely on dual 
structures of causal and formal transactions,178 with the formal 
stage being highly abstract, using simple contracts and 
enforcing a closed number of property rights. This excludes the 
possibility of enforcing a wider variety of rights in rem.179 
Second, the core peer-to-peer structure of blockchain faces 
insurmountable difficulties to reach contractual completion and 
to interact with the real word,180 two difficulties that have been 
framed here in terms of, respectively, contract (in personam) 
rights and property (in rem) rights. 
Third, to overcome these difficulties and to complement its 
core peer-to-peer structure, blockchain development will 
encourage the proliferation of a myriad of new specialists to 
provide effective contractual completion as well as interfaces 
between the virtual and real worlds to most end users and for 
most assets.181 
Fourth, the emergence of specialized agents will reduce 
some costs at the price of increasing agency costs, therefore 
creating additional conflicts of interests. This will open up 
additional opportunities for fraud and trigger greater demand 
for centralized and specialized enforcement and regulation.182 
More generally, because of the role of intermediaries, 
blockchain is likely to affect transaction costs in all types of 
transactions, modifying the comparative advantages of different 
organizational forms and institutions, e.g., the optimal degree of 
vertical and horizontal integration in business firms and other 
organizations, and even the relative optimal scope of markets 
and politics as information, decisional, and allocation 
mechanisms. However, not only the extent but also the signs of 
these impacts are open to question. Therefore, contrary to 
                                                          
 177. See discussion supra note 36. 
 178. See, e.g., supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 179. Supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 180. See, e.g., supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 181. See, e.g., supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
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common assertions, it is debatable if blockchain really favors 
market transactions over business firms, and to what extent.183 
Lastly, blockchain will find it easier to enable transactions 
in personal (i.e, contractual, in personam) rights as compared to 
real (i.e., property, in rem) rights. To move from the world of 
personal rights to the world of real rights will require public 
interfaces and interventions (at the very least, to establish the 
status of the blockchain as judicial evidence). Therefore, 
applications of blockchain in property transactions will likely be 
limited to document notarization and the conveyance of small-
stakes and possession-based transactions, as well as to, at the 
most, the use of private blockchains for archiving purposes 
within standard registration systems. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 183. For instance, TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 14, at 142, claim that 
“as technology continues to drop costs in the market, it’s conceivable that 
corporations could and should have very little inside—except software and 
capital”). The analysis here points out that powerful forces also operate in the 
opposite direction: mainly, the emergence of new contractual specialists, who in 
most cases will likely be organized as business firms instead of acting as 
individuals. 
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